Commentary

It can be assumed that towards the end of the ceasefire in Gaza, Hamas will try to have the cessation of hostilities become permanent through a semi-official arrangement with Qatar and Egypt. It will likely set a whole host of conditions for the release of the rest of the captives it holds, including: the release of top terrorists from Israeli prisons, the IDF's withdrawal from Gaza border areas to the October 6 lines, an Israeli pledge to refrain from “ground invasions” and targeted killings, and international guarantees to launch a Gaza reconstruction program.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu needs to instruct the Shin Bet, Defense Minister Yoav Gallant the IDF Intelligence Directorate, and the Foreign Ministry, to expose all of the incriminating information on UNRWA. So far there has been no high-level political discussion on “What is Israel’s policy toward UNRWA?” making such urgent discussion necessary. 

Without an effective command center abroad, and after it suffers devastating damage to its military and governing capabilities in Gaza, Hamas may lose its status as a movement with regional influence, even if it continues to wield local influence as an organization on the run. Israel and its neighbors have a shared interest in seeing this through.

Even those who have subscribed to a governing paradigm over the past 30 years that has been based on the idea of Palestinian independence as a core component of Israel's security cannot ignore the implications of establishing such a state as a result of an Israeli military defeat in Gaza. This is not how deterrence is restored; this is not how one survives in the Middle East.