The Oslo process, which started between Israel and the Palestinians 25 years ago, clearly failed to bring a resolution to the regional conflict and did not result in a peaceful coexistence between the two peoples. The nearly 1,600 Israeli fatalities and thousands of casualties during this period by Palestinian terrorist attacks and rocket fire testify to this failure.
Late Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin's land-for-security formula did not work. Moreover, the Palestinian Authority, established within the framework of the 1993 Oslo Accords, now rules the West Bank and promotes anti-Israel hatred through its education system and controlled media. Its rival, Hamas, an Islamist organization dedicated to the destruction of the Jewish state, rules the Gaza Strip and continues the armed struggle against Israel.
The chances that a new American peace plan will lead to the establishment of a stable, unified and peaceful Palestinian state are nil. The differences in positions, particularly on refugees and Jerusalem, are unbridgeable. Moreover, the PA has displayed considerable difficulties in state building, and the resulting entity borders on a failed state.
The PA has failed to meet the essential test of statehood, namely monopoly over the use of force, and subsequently lost control over part of its territory – Gaza. It is hard to imagine the PA surviving without the infusion of billions of dollars of international aid, as it mirrors the deep socio-economic and political crisis of several Arab states, leaving a big question mark on the capacity of the Arab political culture to sustain modern states.
Finally, both sides of the ethnoreligious conflict still have the energy to fight over the things important to them. Such protracted conflicts usually end only if at least one side displays great weariness of the conflict.
Therefore, 25 years after Oslo we are left with two revisionist Palestinian national movements, one traditional and one Islamist, controlling parts of would-be Palestine. Palestinian-ruled territories constitute local terrorism bases against Israel, yet Palestinian terror has largely been contained and more vigorous Israeli actions could further limit its impact on Israeli lives.
The Palestinian ability to exact great political cost is limited, particularly if Israel benefits from moderate American diplomatic support. Appeals to ineffective international forums can be ignored, while some international institutions have only marginal impact. Similarly, the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions campaign has largely failed, although some of its long-range ramifications should be a cause for concern.
Significantly, most world states conduct their relations with Israel, paying little attention to the oscillations in Israeli-Palestinian nexus. Moreover, the awareness that the Palestinians are not ready for statehood has slowly spread into foreign policy decision-making fora. Subsequently, a greater international indifference to the Palestinian issue has developed, even among Arab states, as plenty of crises in the Middle East and elsewhere attract greater attention. The Trump administration's decisions to recognize Jerusalem as Israel's capital, and the cuts in funding to the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East and to the PA reflect as well, the decreased appeal of the Palestinian cause in the international arena.
While the conflict with the Palestinians will not end any time soon, Israel is blooming. Israel's cautious strategy of conflict management (rather than conflict resolution) of recent years has been successful in minimizing the domestic and international damage from the continuous Palestinian hostility.
Israel's willingness to make concessions is useful for retaining social cohesion at home and for gaining points among friends abroad. At the international level, Israel nourishes its relations with its main ally, the U.S., and has developed strategic partnerships with many important states. The continuous turmoil in the Middle East and Iranian behavior sensitizes the international community to Israel's security needs, which reduces pressures for meeting unrealistic Palestinian demands.
The Oslo process amounted to a partition of from the would-be Palestinian state because it led to a situation where more than 95% of the Palestinians in the West Bank and all Palestinians in Gaza live under Palestinian rule.
As we have seen in other parts of the world, partitions can be messy and without clear-cut political outcomes. Indeed, the Oslo process failed to attain peace and security for Israel, but it much relieved the Jewish State of the Palestinian burden. The limited Israeli military presence in the West Bank is only marginally concerned with the welfare of the Palestinians; the security of the Israelis is its main goal. Israel is no longer responsible for the Palestinians and they are on their own. Despite the anti-Israel rhetoric, the "occupation" of the Palestinians has practically ended. Anyone visiting Ramallah, with its cafes and shopping centers, can see it for himself.
Most Israelis have supported the traditional Zionist position that led to the Oslo Accords, although misgivings about the wisdom of choosing them-Palestinian leader Yasser Arafat as a partner were widespread. Israelis also supported the 2005 withdrawal from Gaza and the establishment of a security barrier that signal a desire to disengage from territories heavily populated by Arabs.
While Israeli society paid dearly for the Oslo experiment, it can honestly say, "We tried to make peace with the Palestinians." Such a feeling is a prerequisite for treating future armed conflict as a "no-choice war." This attitude, prevalent since the Palestinian terrorist campaign that started in 2000, has been central in forging great Israeli resilience to withstand protracted conflict, and an unwillingness to make dangerous concessions.
