This week marked the 21-year anniversary of the IDF's withdrawal from southern Lebanon – a withdrawal under Hezbollah fire and public pressure from home. The hope in Israel was that removing the IDF from Lebanon would negate Hezbollah's excuse to keep attacking Israel – as if Hezbollah needs any excuse to fight us – and ensure peace and quiet along the northern border.
Follow Israel Hayom on Facebook and Twitter
This assumption, however, or better yet illusion, was swiftly dashed. In very short order, Hezbollah renewed its terrorist attacks against Israel, thus proving that fighting the Jewish state is simply its nature, an inseparable part of its identity, regardless of the Israeli withdrawal from south Lebanon.
Then, too, there were those in Israel who chose to view the fight against Hezbollah as a matter confined to the border area and at the very most the adjacent villages. These people even believed that the missiles Iran was providing to Hezbollah at an ever-increasing pace would eventually rust in their warehouses and that they weren't a threat to Israel anyway.
This fantasy, however, utterly collapsed in the summer of 2006 when Hezbollah dragged Israel into a war, raining down thousands of missiles in a barrage the IDF was unable to stymie.
Lacking a bank of targets to attack – whether operatives or senior commanders, launch pits or weapons factories – the IDF hit, perhaps without intending, the soft underbelly of the "state of Hezbollah" – in other words, its economic infrastructure and home front. The IDF ravaged Hezbollah's stronghold in the Dahiyeh neighborhood of south Beirut, the location of its command and control centers, its leaders' homes, organizational assets, and where its supporters stored their wealth.
Hezbollah understood the message, was deterred, and ever since has taken pains to maintain complete peace and quiet along the border. The danger the terrorist organization poses to Israel hasn't dissipated, and if given the opportunity it will strike us. Israel's might, however, has ensured enduring deterrence and unprecedented quiet on the northern border.
The disengagement from Gaza, in September 2005, also took place under fire from Hamas and domestic public pressure. It, too, bread hopes of peace and quiet, and it, too, quickly led to rocket fire and repeatedly failed attempts to contain it. The assumption that Hamas would focus inward toward Gaza and shelve its holy war to liberate Palestine also proved to be delusional. As did the assumption that Hamas would suffice with terrorist attacks along the Gaza border. The organization learned the lesson from Lebanon, and with help and direction from Iran and Hezbollah, amassed an arsenal of missiles that it hasn't hesitated to launch at Israel in moments of truth.
Operation Guardian of the Walls sought to create deterrence against Hamas similar to the deterrence against Hezbollah. The Rimal neighborhood of Gaza City, Hamas' "Dahiyeh," was turned to rubble, although a concerted effort against the "state of Hamas" rather than just its military capabilities would have undoubtedly produced a far more convincing outcome.
It's clear that Hamas, similar to Hezbollah, won't give up its struggle against Israel and its commitment to "Palestine from the river to the sea." The Qatari money helping Hamas solidify its grip on Gaza won't divert it from its goal, precisely as the establishment of the "state of Hezbollah" in Lebanon didn't prevent the organization from attacking Israel. Only effective deterrence capabilities, meaning that rather than lip service Israel delivers a harsh blow against the "state of Hamas" for every infraction and disturbance – beyond just weapons factories – could ensure that quiet is upheld over time.
Subscribe to Israel Hayom's daily newsletter and never miss our top stories!
