On Friday evening, unusual indicators of Hamas activity in Gaza reached the security establishment. This information pertained to suspicious movements by Hamas members that did not provide a clear picture of the expected attack.
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This information was conveyed to the top security echelons. Consultations were held in the IDF, with attendees including the heads of intelligence and operations directorates and the Southern Command, and parallel consultations were held in the Shin Bet security agency. Some officials believed that these movements were part of a drill, and it was decided to gather additional information and not to elevate the alert level among troops on the border.
In the Shin Bet, there was suspicion that this was not a drill, although not on the scale that ultimately prevailed. The concern was that the organization was planning some kidnapping operation or rocket attack, and the head of the Shin Bet even went to the organization's headquarters during the night hours.
He held consultations with senior members of the organization, and at the end, he ordered a team of operation operatives composed of Shin Bet's operations branch and the special counterterrorism police unit to be sent to the south to be in a forward position in case an event unfolds. This team arrived in the Sderot area early in the morning, and when the attack broke out, they joined the combat against the terrorists.
Security officials said yesterday that the indications and warnings (I&W) collected could not in any way point to the scale of the attack that occurred. They expressed astonishment at what appeared to be a "coordinated attempt by Prime Minister Netanyahu to lay the blame solely on the security establishment."
This, after IDF Chief of Staff Herzi Halevi admitted yesterday that the IDF did not live up to its task of protecting the state and its citizens. This was the first time that anyone in Israel's leadership echelons took responsibility for the failure. Netanyahu avoided this in his speeches, and it was reported yesterday from his office that he was only updated about the Hamas attack on Saturday "at 06:29 and not before." The statement added that "he left immediately for the Kirya, conducted a situation assessment, and convened the Diplomatic-Security Cabinet."
Officials in the security establishment accuse Netanyahu of " trying to set a narrative that would cast him as someone who bears no responsibility for the event," and one of them added: "It is sad that the person responsible for the security establishment is doing while the fighting continues, on the backs of the people who have been leading it."
Another source said that Netanyahu will have a hard time avoiding blame for the failure, as he has served as prime minister for almost 14 consecutive years. Under his watch, the perception of strengthening Hamas at the expense of the Palestinian Authority, the transfer of suitcases of money to the organization, and the entry of workers into Israel have been exacerbated, as have the indecisive rounds of fighting and neglecting the handling of various issues related to the Gaza border communities."
His cabinets also approved the offensive and defensive plans for the IDF in Gaza, and in the months leading to the attack he had been warned several times that the judicial reform crisis has led to Israel's weakening and could encourage terrorism against it.
This suspicion among the top political and security echelons is very troubling, given the dramatic issues at hand: a war in Gaza, the possibility of escalation in the north, and the need to address the unprecedented scope of casualties, captives, displaced residents, and missing persons.
This is a complex situation that requires continuous and synchronized coordination among the various decision-makers. Now it is doubtful whether it can be properly managed at this time.
A former senior figure in the security establishment told me that following these leaks, various leaks would soon emerge from closed forums that would seemingly indicate instructions had been given but not carried out. "This is a familiar ritual, only in this case, it is unnecessary," he added. "This disaster is too great, and none of those at the helm would be able to keep their job."
The security establishment is currently focused on the fighting, but the prevailing assessment is that, once the war is concluded, senior officials will take responsibility and resign. It is possible that this will happen even before a committee of inquiry is established to investigate the tragedy. The IDF and the Shin Bet have already stated that they will fully cooperate with it to enable a methodic process of drawing conclusions and producing lessons. The nature of the committee will be decided only after the end of the war, but in the past, Netanyahu made sure not to establish an investigation committee that can force heads to roll – to ensure that responsibility is not placed on him.
It is doubtful whether, in light of the current disaster – more than 1,300 dead, more than 100 captives, thousands of injured, extensive destruction, and severe erosion to deterrence – the public will allow him to establish a mock inquiry forum that will place responsibility only on the professional elements."
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