When I heard the astonishing reports about Israeli Air Force strikes in Iran, 1,500 kilometers (930 miles) from home base, about the achievement of complete air superiority in the skies of a huge enemy state, about the destruction of ballistic missiles and their launchers, the destruction of production infrastructure and more, I first thanked God for blessing us with heroic and talented air crews, dedicated ground crews and a command-and-control system.
Then, lost in thought, I remembered Friday, June 5, 1981. We had left Hatzerim Air Force Base, where the squadron in which I served was stationed, for a long weekend. Sunday was the eve of Shavuot and Monday was the holiday itself, so we were not supposed to return until Tuesday. I arrived at my parents' home in Binyamina with my new wife, hoping, as noted, for a pleasant and unusually long break. But already on Friday afternoon, through a "quiet call," meaning a phone call, I received an order to return to base. At the squadron, we were told that an operational order had been issued for Operation Opera, the strike on the Osirak nuclear reactor in Iraq.
A few months earlier, when I was first exposed to the operation, I thought someone at Air Force headquarters had lost his mind or become confused. The target and the route seemed insane to me. From our squadron, a command-and-control squadron, two planes took part. They were supposed to provide early detection, assist in interception and, if heaven forbid necessary, also direct search-and-rescue forces.
The operation was the execution of the government's decision to destroy Iraq's nuclear potential.
As prime minister, Menachem Begin established two fundamental principles. The first: When an enemy of the Jewish people says he intends to destroy it, believe him. Begin, a member of the generation that experienced the Holocaust and a man with a deep historical consciousness, knew the threat must not be ignored. His second determination was that we would not allow an enemy of the Jewish people to acquire weapons of mass destruction. This, too, stemmed from the experience the Jewish people had endured in that generation and from a commitment to the eternity of Israel.
After the diplomatic channel failed, mainly with France, the reactor's supplier, and other actions to damage and delay the process of building Iraq's nuclear stockpile also bore no fruit, Begin reached the decision that Israel had to launch a military operation. It was not a simple or obvious decision. The Mossad chief opposed it; his deputy strongly supported it. The head of Military Intelligence opposed it; his deputy supported it. Great importance lay in the unequivocal support and belief in the feasibility of the operation shown by IDF Chief of Staff Rafael Eitan and Israeli Air Force Commander David Ivry.
Begin summoned both the supporters and the opponents to the cabinet meeting so they could present the ministers with the full range of arguments. Begin had a majority in the government, but he sought consensus and invested effort in persuading the hesitant ministers. After the decision was made, and after two postponements, the mission got underway. Two formations of four attack aircraft, air defense aircraft and supporting forces took to the air. It was a complex mission, at the edge of the aircraft's fuel range, and perhaps beyond it. The Americans did not believe the flight had been carried out without aerial refueling, a capability Israel did not yet possess at the time.
It was also the first time in history that a nuclear facility had been attacked. Everyone involved in the strike felt they were part of history. But I also remember it because it ruined our weekend vacation.
Herzl Makov is chairman of the executive board of the Menachem Begin Heritage Center.
