Last Wednesday, US President Donald Trump met with Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa (al-Julani). It appears Trump chose to ignore the fact that until that meeting, al-Sharaa had been a wanted terrorist in the eyes of the Americans. Overnight, he became wanted in Washington under very different circumstances. "A young and attractive guy," Trump said of al-Sharaa. "A tough guy with a strong background. A very strong background. A fighter." Notably, the American president failed to mention that this "fighter" he praised led a Sunni Islamist-jihadist organization that persecuted and killed men, women, and children during the Syrian civil war solely because of their religious beliefs or political affiliations.
This isn't the first time the US has let itself be swept away by wishful thinking in the Middle East, particularly in Syria, a path that has led at best to disappointment and at worst to disaster and tragedy.
On March 30, 1949, Syrian army chief of staff Husni al-Za'im staged the country's first military coup, setting the stage for many more to come. Fascinatingly, Za'im received guidance and support from Washington, especially from the CIA. The Americans, in their romanticized view, believed that if Arab nations were led by honest, smart, and courageous leaders willing to act "in the interests of their countries," peace and economic partnerships could follow.
To the Americans, Za'im was the ideal figure to promote these aims and a model for other Middle Eastern nations. He kept his promises: aside from approving the Saudi-American oil company Aramco's pipeline through Syria, shortly before his downfall he even proposed a peace deal with Israel, to absorb Palestinian refugees who had fled to Syria in exchange for land and part of the Sea of Galilee.
The problem was that amid all the euphoria, Za'im developed delusions of grandeur and managed to alienate everyone, including his American allies. On August 14, 1949, he was deposed in another coup and executed that same day. For the Americans, it was a failed experiment.
Admittedly, Syria of 2025 is not Syria of 1949. But after 80 years of involvement in the region, one would expect the US to have learned a thing or two about culture, religious traditions, ideological motivations, and especially the character of local leaders.
This is particularly relevant following the presidential summit between Trump and al-Sharaa. Trump lifted American sanctions on Syria and opened the door to its reconstruction. And just as the US had conditions for Za'im, it now has demands for Syria's new regime. Trump called on al-Sharaa to usher in nothing short of a revolution in Syria's foreign policy: joining the Abraham Accords and expelling Palestinian terrorists from the country. The question is whether al-Sharaa, who has yet to fully consolidate his grip over a fragmented and devastated Syria, is capable of such a bold move.
To date, no Islamist movement that seized power has ever abandoned its ideology. Quite the contrary - every past success has emboldened a wider Islamist surge. This was true in Iran after the 1979 revolution, and again after the Arab Spring, when Islamist movements, many tied to the Muslim Brotherhood, rose to power in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and now Syria. Given al-Sharaa's past in al-Qaida and Islamic State, a shift in worldview seems unlikely.
Nonetheless, the new Middle Eastern order that Trump laid out during his visit to the region demands that decision-makers in Jerusalem craft an out-of-the-box strategy. Israel did well to enter the buffer zone stretching from Mount Hermon to Hamat Gader, but the next step is now required. If Trump is speaking the language of peace, that doesn't mean we must follow him blindly, but we should listen to what Damascus has to offer and consider what security guarantees the US and Europe might provide if a deal is reached. For now, it is better to be wise than to be right. The "I told you so" can wait.
