At a change of command ceremony in the Gaza Division, GOC Southern Command Maj. Gen. Herzl Halevi said, "In Gaza, there is a deterred enemy looking for any way, both below and above ground, to harm Israel."
He said that IDF officials do not want Israelis living near the Gaza border to hear rocket warning sirens and said that many residents in the south and Israelis in general feel that Israel's deterrent power against Hamas has been eroded.
Has Israel maintained or lost its deterrence? In order to answer that question, one must first clarify what is meant by the term. Along with decisiveness and warning, the principle of deterrence is one of the three cornerstones of Israel's security doctrine. It means the ability to dissuade an enemy from engaging in armed aggression lest it incur an unbearable cost that would simply not make it worth the trouble. Deterrence is inherently linked to the balance of power between the two sides, both when it comes to military strength and when it comes to the civilian and military ability to endure the aggression and withstand the fighting. Deterrence is not constant. It sometimes requires maintenance and even rehabilitation.
There is no doubt Israel is much stronger than Hamas, militarily and in general. Hamas and the Gaza Strip are under a blockade they can end only by reaching an agreement with Israel. This reflects how the power of enforcement is in Israel's hands. The IDF has also succeeded in neutralizing Hamas' strategic and dangerous efforts toward a "March of Return."
Conversely, despite its lesser military power, Hamas is able to threaten Israel by firing rockets, including at Ben-Gurion International Airport, and determining the "height of the flames" on the Gaza-Israel border. It can also make life miserable for Israelis who live near the Gaza border and challenge them and the IDF with incendiary balloons and kites. Just as bad, Hamas presents a challenge to Israel and the IDF in the form of an intolerable war of attrition.
It is clear that when it comes to Hamas, Israel's deterrence has been eroded. There are two main reasons: The first is the willingness of both Hamas and Gaza's residents to endure quite a bit of suffering. Gaza's miserable and overcrowded population is dependent on Hamas and is full of burning ideological and religious hatred of Israel, which it aspires to destroy. This makes it easier for Hamas and Gazans in general to endure the loss of life and the difficulties they face when dealing with Israel.
But it also seems that Israel itself is not interested in exercising its capacity to deter. The military command, along with the diplomatic echelon, avoids using force largely out of concern for the lives of IDF soldiers and a fear of entanglement in an extensive ground operation. State and IDF leaders often threaten to embark on such an operation in Gaza. But as this not yet happened, these remarks come off as empty threats and spur Hamas to inflict further damage to Israel.
It is ironic that those who have the power of deterrence hesitate to employ it. Israel's efforts to reach an agreement with Hamas, which would require Israeli concessions to a terrorist organization, point to the erosion of Israeli deterrence and will have an impact on other fronts. Without deterrence, Israel's enemies would run wild.
The current situation is insufferable.
How can we rehabilitate the power of deterrence? It should first be noted that the very existence of the Hamas regime illustrates the divisions in the Palestinian camp, and Israel would therefore be wise to keep it from collapsing. It would also be best for Israel to avoid reconquering Gaza and maintaining a long-term military presence there. Nonetheless, it would be wise and appropriate to act to mitigate the military power of Hamas and its partners and conquer parts of Gaza for however long it takes to clear the ground of significant weapons.
Of course, Israel could focus its efforts on an aerial campaign similar to the one the IDF carried out in Gaza during 2014's Operation Protective Edge or in the Beirut suburb of Dahiya, where Hezbollah had its headquarters during the 2006 Second Lebanon War. As part of that campaign, the IDF destroyed civilian infrastructure Hezbollah could have used in its war efforts.
But it may be that an aerial campaign is not enough, and Israel will have no choice but to embark on an extensive ground operation in those territories in which Hamas forces and their partners now operate.
If we do not want to hear more rocket warning sirens, the effective and calculated use of force is necessary to restore deterrence.
