With talks between Iran and western world powers about the US returning to the 2015 nuclear deal poised to relaunch, Israel finds itself in a particularly problematic situation.
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The problem doesn't start with Israel's awkward relations with the Biden administration, but that's where it lands. Primarily because of what is playing out here at home – a serious disagreement between the political leadership and experts about what strategy Israel should now adopt.
The discussion that Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu held this week highlighted the extent of the problem. In the meeting, head of the National Security Council Meir Ben-Shabbat laid out an approach that is very contrary to that of the Americans, which another official called "particularly apocalyptic and extreme." Other officials in the meeting, namely Mossad director Yossi Cohen and IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Aviv Kochavi, opposed that approach, arguing that Israel needed to avoid a public clash with Washington and needed to use discreet tactics with the new administration. Head of the IDF's Military Intelligence Directorate Maj. Gen. Tamir Hayman and director of the Israel Atomic Energy Commission Zeev Snir were of like mind, as was Defense Minister Director-General Amir Eshel and head of the Defense Ministry's Political-Military Bureau Zohar Palti.
This disagreement between experts reflects to a large extent something similar in the political echelon. The prime minister is very skeptical about the possibility of reaching understandings with the Americans that will improve the original nuclear deal, whereas Defense Minister Benny Gantz and Foreign Minister Gabi Ashkenazi believe that Israel must try and talk to the administration, as well as other signatories to the deal, primarily Germany, France, and Britain.
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The meeting ended with operational decisions (the NSC will coordinate a professional forum focusing on the political aspects of the Iranian issue, and the Mossad and the IDF will continue to collect intelligence and prepare military options), but no strategic ones. Israel did not wind up defining what outcome it wants to see, or what its red lines will be. The only thing agreed upon was the need to work with the Washington administration for now, if only to ensure that every effort has been made.
The awkwardness on the Israeli side, which are increasing in light of the upcoming election and the intense rivalry between Netanyahu and Gantz and Ashkenazi, will make it very hard for Israel to wage an effective campaign with the US administration, which already appears to have little empathy for Israel. The Americans have committed to keeping Iran away from a nuclear weapon, but their open eagerness to rejoin the original nuclear deal is very disturbing, given the huge holes in it. Hints from Washington that these holes will be addressed going forward sound particularly naïve: the moment the deal is renewed and the sanctions on Iran are lifted, Iran will have no incentive to agree to any concessions.
In quiet talks between US and Israeli defense bodies over the past few weeks, Israel floated a few subjects that, if changed, could transform the deal "from bad to more than reasonable," as one official put it. Top of the list would be its expiration date, along with tighter oversight of Iran's nuclear activity, limits to its ballistic missile development and manufacturing, and limits to Iran entrenching itself in the Middle East, especially Yemen.
The way things look now, it's doubtful that the Americans see eye to eye with Israel. This is concerning, but not a reason to throw up our hands. The fat lady still hasn't sung, and until that happens, Israel has both time and room to exert influence. To do that, it needs to arrange matters at home and coalesce a clear strategy.
