The fourth Netanyahu government left its successor, the fifth Netanyahu government, a relatively quiet situation in terms of defense and security, as well as a few headaches and matters that cannot be put off. How they are addressed will depend largely on who is appointed defense minister. In the likely event that coalition and party maneuvering make it difficult for Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to hold onto the defense portfolio, the degree of independence the new minister enjoys will have a direct effect on the military and how it handles the various defense and security challenges in our region.
Gaza
After a stormy year and just before everything was about to blow up, calm was restored two weeks ago after rockets were fired at the Tel Aviv area and Moshav Mishmeret in the Sharon region and the Gaza periphery was being pummeled daily. Intensive foreign intervention was needed – mostly from Egypt, but also from the U.N. and Qatar.
Still, it's barely a placebo. The problems in Gaza are deeply rooted. Unemployment there is sky-high, infrastructures are collapsing and desperation is at record levels. Hamas is afraid of a full-scale conflict with Israel but is even more afraid of its own people, who are showing signs of growing restiveness and distress. Since it can't provide solutions, it will probably soon go back to provoking Israel in an attempt to secure a general truce that will include massive rehabilitation for the Gaza Strip.
Israel will agree, on the condition that the deal includes demilitarization of the Strip, a move that Hamas is unlikely to accept. The alternative will be war, a step both sides are trying to avoid, but probably won't be able to in the long term. Netanyahu won in most of the towns near Gaza – Sderot, Ashkelon, Netivot, Ofakim – and now they're demanding that he provide them with defense.
Moments before that happens, the new government would do well to put together Israel's first-ever inclusive strategy for dealing with Gaza. That would ensure that goals are met – first and foremost, Israel deciding whether Hamas comprises the legitimate ruling force in Gaza or a target to be taken down.
Iran
The U.S. designation Monday of the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps as a terrorist group steps up pressure on Tehran. It's another attempt to isolate Iran and bring it to the point where it has to decide whether to remain alone, a leper, or give up not only its nuclear weapons program but also its long-range ballistic missile project and its efforts to disseminate regional terrorism.
In the meantime, despite the pressure, Iran is holding on. Its activity is palpable, to varying degrees, in Yemen, Iraq, Syria, Lebanon and Gaza. In recent years, Israel took advantage of the war in Syria to battle Iran's attempts to establish a foothold there and set up a front against Israel, but will now have to reexamine its policy to ensure that it retains freedom of action on one hand, while avoiding unnecessary entanglements on the other, especially with Russia and with Hezbollah in Lebanon. It's a thin line and a step to either side could result in open clashes. As in the past, the results of the game will be determined through a combination of intelligence and operational capabilities. It's doubtful that Israel will manage to oust Iran from its north entirely, but the goal will be to keep it weak there – without bases and far from the border.
Judea and Samaria
In recent years, the security fence has ensured relative quiet, despite plenty of incidents that threatened to light up the territory again (the U.S. relocating its embassy to Jerusalem, the situation in Gaza and Hamas' efforts to carry out terrorist attacks there). The Palestinian street expressed minimal if any interest in the political issue and focused on life itself – mostly making a living.
The Trump administration's "deal of the century," which it is slated to unveil soon, could change the situation. For the Palestinians, it would mark the end of PA President Mahmoud Abbas and the battle to succeed him could rend the Palestinian public. For Israel, after years of a standstill, a real discussion would have to be held on a real solution for Judea and Samaria, especially with Netanyahu's election pledge to annex settlements in Judea and Samaria still hanging in the air.
The security challenge will be to make it through all this without a spike in the number of terrorist attacks and without a renewed popular Palestinian uprising, no simple task given the PA's recalcitrance. Israel will need to preserve its coordination with Palestinian security forces and mainly, work with Palestinian civilians economically so that most of them stay outside the circle of violence.
Budget
The outgoing government left the IDF and the defense establishment as a whole with unusual stability: after years, the military was working with a set budget that allowed it to implement its multi-year work plan (Gideon) in full. The result was more projects, more supplies, more training and less improvising.
The IDF is already working on a new plan for the next five years that is supposed to begin next year. Its implementation depends on budget, which would require new agreements with the Finance Ministry, which will depend on the power of the defense and finance ministers and the country's overall economic situation.
According to all the numbers and given the large deficit the outgoing government is leaving behind, the new government will have to make painful cuts, especially to defense and security. That will make life difficult for the IDF and could bring it back to the situation it was in prior to Operation Protective Edge, when it was forced to stop training and building itself up. As always, the government would do well to avoid temporary solutions and give the defense establishment a clear framework with which to work from the outset. Even if that framework is cut back, it will be able to work in an orderly manner.
Military and society
It will no longer be possible to evade these issues, especially in light of the ongoing decline in motivation to enlist in the IDF in general and combat units in particular. The figures point to a need for a systemic solution that is not the IDF's responsibility. This is a national matter that crosses barriers between various ministries. If the matter is not resolved, the military will be in a permanent stage of shortage.
The previous government dissolved itself before finding an answer to the perennial question of haredi conscription and it's doubtful that the new one will be able to do anything now that the haredi parties have more power in the Knesset. The ongoing avoidance of the necessary solution – universal service (military service for all who are fit and national service for the rest) – will leave the matter open to political and legal battles and even worse, could have an effect on recruits, who represent an increasingly small sector of the population.
And that's not all: in the past few years, the IDF has been dragged into political battles, to its detriment: women's enlistment and integration into combat units; public relations battles with the Right and the Left; and regulations for opening fire after the Elor Azaria affair are only a few examples. Anyone who thinks these are strictly military matters is wrong; the challenge for the new government, particularly the defense minister, will be to keep the IDF out of the debate.
