Trigger warning: A missile attack that would interfere with Israel's defenses and be difficult for the country to recover from is an extreme scenario, but one that Brig. Gen. (res.) Udi Dekel lays out in detail, without any whitewashing, in a report by the Institute of National Security Studies.
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Until now, the threat of a massive missile attack and widespread damage to the Israeli home front was something that the public and media barely discussed. But starting in 2020 and now, at the start of 2021, Dekel and the INSS rank it high on the list of current threats. While the nuclear threat from Iran is still higher, in the short-term, a war could break out to our north and east against a coalition led by Iran in which Hezbollah, Syria, pro-Iranian militias and other players would attack us from western Iraq. Dekel, whose last job in the IDF was head of the strategy division in the General Staff's planning department, calls this possibility "definitely relevant" and describes the arsenal that would be unleashed on us if it were to come to pass.
"Among other things: missiles and drones from Syria and Lebanon [Hezbollah], ballistic missiles and cruise missile from Iran and Iraq," he says, and in a secondary scenario, "rockets, attack drones, and mortars from the Gaza Strip."
The concern, he says, is that "these coordinated forces will exploit the military capabilities they have to launch surprise missiles barrages and slews of drones in an attempt to take out many targets inside Israel."
The choice targets of an attack on Israel are what the report calls "high-value strategic targets." This means, "air defense batteries, the refineries in Haifa, power stations, and desalination plans, warehouses containing toxic materials, gas infrastructure, the Prime Minister's Office, the Knesset, the General Staff's building, military command headquarters, air force bases, airports, seaports, army bases, the IDF's Kirya base, missile interceptor systems…"
"If the enemy succeeds in firing extensive barrages [of hundreds of missiles] at one time from different launching locations," Dekel says, noting that this is not implausible, "Israel's air defenses could be expected to have difficulty handling the threat. The result will be destruction, and in certain circumstances widespread casualties in population centers. This describes the threat of a massive attack on the primary cities and strategic sites using precision missiles, which is something Israel has never experienced," he says.
'No effective response'
The INSS's extreme scenario was published a few days after the Defense Ministry announced that it was developing the Arrow 4 system in conjunction with the US, a system designed to be able to cope with ballistic missiles fired from Iran, among other things. Only recently did former IDF Ombudsman Maj. Gen. (res.) Yitzhik Brik define Israel as "the most threatened country in the world, on which hundreds of thousands of missiles are trained throughout the Middle East."
Brik thinks that "Israel has no appropriate solution for this threat, either offensive or defensive." But Brik is known for being a near-constant opposition voice to the defense and security establishment, whereas the threat scenario that comprises an entire chapter in the INSS report, was written by an official who generally takes care not to clash with that same establishment.
Anyone who reads Dekel's chapter will notice the wide discrepancy between the growing missile threat to Israel's security and how nonchalant the general public is about it. Dekel and the institute define the Israeli home front as "a critical weak point in the country's ability to handle a lengthy war."
The report states that "Israel invests in preparing the home front, but not enough, and especially not in preparing for what is described as the extreme scenario, which is based on trends that have existed for some time on the map of regional threats. The home front's ability to deal with damage and numerous wounded demands unity among the people and a sense of justice and trust in a responsible government, which first and foremost takes care of Israel's future."
In a conversation with Israel Hayom last week, Dekel said that the public was not aware of the heavy price that could have to be paid if the "extreme scenario" came to pass.
"Seventy percent of the public support between-war actions, even if they come at a cost of a full-scale war," he says. Currently, the "between-war" mainly entails strikes on Iranian targets in Syria.
"But a similar percent does not fully realize what the cost of a full-scale war will be. Someone should explain to the public what we're talking about," he says.
"There is a major dispute between experts about the weakness of the public as it is being revealed to us during the [COVID] pandemic. Will the public fall down in spirit and fail to withstand a serious security incident of the kind we're describing? Most tend to assume that in the case of this kind of an event, the public will go back to showing the same kind of solidarity that was so characteristic of it during past wars. This is especially important when it comes to discipline and following instructions, which are vital aspects to defending the home front from major attacks, to keep the number of wounded down," he says.
Dekel's loaded paper does not discuss numbers of potential wounded and casualties in this kind of attack, but he says that "the government has avoided revealing the extent of the danger in order to maintain deterrence, keep the public calm, and maintain calm."
Dekel thinks that "If our deterrence is harmed, civilians will find it difficult to spend long periods in shelters and safe rooms, and there could be many wounded."
He notes that in the arms race between the enemy, on the offense, and Israel, defending itself, Israel is at a disadvantage from the get-go because developing and manufacturing rockets and missiles is relatively cheap and unsophisticated, in comparison to the development and manufacture of air defenses and interceptor systems.
He also suggests that decision-makers take an interest in the abilities that major powers, mainly Russia, are developing in areas like supersonic cruise missiles and ballistic missiles, whose paths are difficult to predict and intercept. These capabilities could make their way to our region.
Dekel describes how Israel has developed a multi-layer system of air defenses against families of threats of different ranges: Iron Dome, David's Sling, and the Arrow, but says that "this view is not a sufficient answer to advanced, variegated threats, especially in a combat environment with many fronts and different types of offensive weaponry used simultaneously."
The report includes a long list of threats, starting with simple ones that have a range of up to 40 km (25 miles); Fajr rockets, which have a range of 50-90 km (31-56 miles); and Zalala rockets (100-200 km/62-124 miles), not to mention the Fateh 100 and M-600 missiles, with ranges of up to 500 km (310 miles). Some of them carry precision-guided warheads and could be fired from Lebanon or Syria.
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The list also includes different models of Scud missiles, which have a range of 300-700 km (185-435 miles), which could also be fired from Syria and north Lebanon; Shahab 3 and 4 missiles, with ranges of 1,300-2,000 km (800-1,200 miles), which could be fired from Iran, and advanced cruise missiles that could be fired from Iran and Iraq.
In the case of a missile attack of this kind, Israel's Achilles heel is its home front, but not only that.
"By launching combined volleys of all sorts of threats from different locations, the enemies could give the IDF a hard time locating and intercepting precision missiles aimed at strategic, sensitive targets that are vital to keeping the IDF's system of command and control functioning, as well as at vital infrastructure for the home front: supplies of water, electricity, and food."
A new balance of power
Dekel lays out another concern, one that has not been publicly discussed: "the judicious use of the launch capabilities in the enemy's hands – for example, firing heavy, varied barrages that could overcome the IDF's prioritization strategy and quickly use up its stock of interceptor missiles. Dekel also discusses the high cost of this kind of military confrontation: over $30 million for weaponry alone, not counting damage to property and lives lost.
Q: What factors could lead to this kind of missile attack on Israel?
"It's probable that an attack on Israel would develop in response to events of escalation that would strengthen the enemy's motivation and lead to missile attacks from the air, increasing its regional and international legitimacy."
Q: What kind of 'events of escalation'?
"A secret Israeli attack – one for which Israel doesn't take responsibility – on Iran's infrastructure and development sites, which would cause major damage to infrastructure, Iranian scientist, and other workers; an Israeli attacks on missile assembly sites and warehouse sites in Syria, Lebanon and Iraq that would result in heavy losses to Iran's Quds Force and to Hezbollah; or a terrorist action by extremist Jews that would lead to the destruction of significant parts of Al-Aqsa Mosque and lead to thousands of direct and/or indirect wounded in the riots that would erupt following it."
Dekel is more worried about a sudden incident than a gradual devolution. "When we're talking about a process, there is more readiness, and we might possibly have an opportunity to deal a major blow to the missile threat, both in terms of number and quality, that Hezbollah is setting up against us in the North," he says.
Dekel warns that preparations must be made for the worst-case scenario, but that even the worst could arrive "as a result of a deterioration that no one wants."
The underlying assumption to the extreme scenario is that "Israel's enemies, especially Iran, are aware of the vulnerable points and the gaps in the Israeli home front's defense capabilities and are focusing their efforts on making themselves able to wage a long, multi-front war during which sites that are vital to the continued functioning of the military and civil society would be attacked. The goal would be to hurt Israel's ability to function, interfere with its ability to fight, weaken it economically and socially in the long term and present a picture of victory that will influence the public mindset in Israel."
The INSS report also devotes space to the "precision revolution," which it says "comprises a dramatic change in the enemy's offensive capabilities. It is much more effective to fire a few precision missiles than to indiscriminately fire dozens or hundreds of statistical rockets. The enemy's ability to reach an image of victory by hitting strategic sites or symbols of the Israeli government can create a new balance of power."
Ahead of expected nuclear talks between the US and Iran, and the demand that these talks include other issues, such as Iran's ballistic missile program, Dekel mentions that Israel is the one asking for the nuclear issue to be kept separate from the other matters.
"We did so mainly so as not to create links and conditions between different subjects that might not be worth it," he says.
Incidentally, US President Joe Biden promised before he was elected that after consulting its allies and partners, the US would negotiate with Iran not only about extending the nuclear deal, but also about its missile program. Now that Biden is president, that promise will be put to the test.
