The friendly fire incident that resulted in the deaths of two Egoz Unit officers – Maj. Itamar Elharar, 26, and Maj. Ofek Aharon, 28 – on Thursday is one of the most difficult, and avoidable, the Israel Defense Forces has seen in recent years.
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That is also why it is so shocking: the tragedy could have been avoided and the fact that it was not necessitates a thorough investigation into the circumstances that led to the tragedy.
The preliminary investigation conducted immediately after the incident paints quite a clear picture of what caused the deaths. It began with a theft of some equipment from a military base, including night-vision goggles, and some commanders' decision to look for the thieves in the middle of the night.
The IDF could not adequately explain on Thursday why the search was conducted at such a late hour. Perhaps the commanders overstepped and thought that the thieves would return at night, giving the officers a chance to catch them.
The search was carried out by two contingents, one led by Elharar and Aharon, and the other by a young team commander in the unit. There was no coordination between the two groups, which is what led to the fatal encounter. Each suspected, mistakenly, that they were facing a threat, and opened fire.
It is unclear how commanders from such an elite unit, with such vast experience in operational activity and training, went out to comb the area in the middle of the night without the most basic coordination, as well as without helmets and communications devices.
All these matters will be at the core of the work of the commission of inquiry launched into the tragedy, headed by Maj. Gen. (res.) Noam Tibo. The commission must expand its scope beyond the preliminary investigation into the incident, for this is the only way the IDF can ensure that no stone was left unturned and to prevent such tragedies from occurring in the future. As such, the probe must review operational procedures.
Who approved it, what exactly was approved, and who knew about it. There is no way that an activity that took place in such a dangerous area would be conducted by each force on its own.
The commission must also investigate whether any pressure was exerted to recover the stolen military equipment, over-motivating the officers, and if so, then by whom.
Lt. Col. A., the commander of Aharon and Elharar's Egoz Unit, made controversial remarks in the past when he criticized a soldier whose weapon was stolen during training. Back then, the IDF decided to turn a blind eye.
And the chain of responsibility cannot end with the unit. In the Duvdevan Unit, which like Egoz is part of the Commando Brigade, there have been several serious incidents in recent years, including the death of Staff Sgt. Shahar Strug, 20, who was killed in March 2018 when a firearm his roommate was playing with was accidentally discharged.
After Strug's death (and after the training exercise accident that left Corporal Eli Hayut from the Maglan Unit paralyzed in August 2018), a special committee was appointed to examine the normative conduct of elite units.
It found "discrepancies" in their routines and decided to establish a special school to train fighters from the Commando Brigade – the Maglan, Duvdevan, Egoz and Rimon units.
Now, they must examine whether the committee did indeed investigate the matter thoroughly and identified the discrepancies, and if whatever was properly identified was addressed and changed.
The military must not fear an exhaustive probe into the matter, even if it would lead to strict conclusions that would affect senior officers. At a time when the public is losing confidence int he IDF, the military has no choice but to act, and do so with full transparency.
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