The succession of Israeli Air Force commanders is more than just another major general stepping down. It is an unusual event, because the job is an unusual one. For all intents and purposes, the person who holds it is the second-most important figure in the General Staff. Former IAF chief Maj. Gen. Amikam Norkin was also an unusual commander.
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Actually, the IAF and the IDF (and Israel, of course) were lucky to have two like these in a row. Norkin's predecessor, Amir Eshel (now Defense Ministry director general), brought the IAF to new heights. This is also why they were both asked to stay on an extra year, so they could further hone the knife they wielded. In recent years, that knife – along with intelligence – has been more responsible than anything else for Israel's dramatic strategic superiority in the region and beyond it. It is Israel's X factor in the Gaza Strip, in Lebanon, in Syria, Egypt, Jordan, and of course Iran, as well as in every open and secret partnership around us.
All this makes the role of IAF commander something far beyond someone responsible for bombs and bombings. This is also why the last four IAF chiefs, from Ido Nehoshtan to recently-appointed Maj. Gen. Tomer Bar, all served as head of the IDF Planning Directorate, which provides a wide prism and a tool to use when dealing with the political leadership, two vital components of the IAF commander's job.
Eshel and Norkin changed the structure of the IAF to significantly increase its operational productivity. This was a lesson from the 2006 Second Lebanon War and the large operations in Gaza, as well as a forward-looking conclusion that in the next major war (probably against Hezbollah) the IAF will need to bring a lot more weapons to a lot more targets, and do so while facing two challenges that have altered in recent years – precision fire (rockets, cruise missiles, and UAVs) that poses a threat to airbases, and the enemy's air defense systems.
The first challenge is the reason behind most of the airstrikes in Syria and beyond that have been attributed to Israel in the past decade. From 2017-2021 the IAF carried out 408 missions, in which 2,259 targets were attacked and 9,175 missiles fired. These numbers are unprecedented, and most of them are off the Israeli public's radar. The IAF commander should also receive credit for the fact that with the exception of one incident (a Sufa plane that was brought down in February 2018 due to an error in planning and execution), all the missions ended well.
The second challenge is tougher, and related to the first. In 2018-2020 alone, the Syrians fired about 1,200 surface-to-air missiles at Israeli planes that allegedly attacked targets in Syria. This forces the IAF to be not only highly precise in planning, and especially execution, but also cautious in a world rife with dangers. While these were "only" Syrian surface-to-air missiles, and some of them were outdated, and many of their systems or system components were destroyed the moment they threatened IAF aircraft, it's clear to anyone familiar with the subject that they were just a taste of what awaits. Especially when there is the possibility of an attack on Iran or a war against Hezbollah (or both), and advanced Russian systems in Syria that could be activated in the future.
These successes are impressive, but can also confuse. Not only because only a single aircraft and its crew needs to be brought down in enemy territory to change the equation dramatically, but also because too many people in Israel make the mistake of thinking that the IAF is strong enough and investment should go into other branches of the military and the security apparatus. This investment is necessary, of course, given the grim situation of the ground forces, and also because Israel's defense spending as part of its state budget is among the lowest in the West, but it cannot come at the expense of augmenting the IAF's capabilities.
There is room for a theoretical debate about whether the IAF can defeat the enemy. In the Middle East, the answer is most likely not (certainly not the Palestinian enemy, and probably not Hezbollah), but it can defeat a country, or at lead cause the enemy to stop the fighting when conditions favor Israel, as has happened in the past. But the IAF is currently suffering from a few fundamental problems, and if they aren't rectified, could limit our exceptional dominance in the future. The main one is the size of the order of battle, along with a personnel crisis, that is prompting more and more good people to leave the military.
The IAF currently has a limited number of platforms that barely suffice for its current missions. It is also due to receive two additional squadrons of F35s, but will also be decommissioning the F16s. Its fleet is dangerously outdated, anyway. Some of the F15s are 50 years old or more, and it now takes much longer from the time a defense deal is signed to the time the aircraft arrive.
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The IAF depends exclusively on American platforms, which are acquired with American money. Every attempt to increase the order of battle and pay in shekels runs up against a brick wall, as if after the 1973 Yom Kippur War Israel, poor and isolated, didn't buy every Phantom jet that was available, and pay for them in lira. This Israeli dependence on the Americans is dangerous, and not because of the constant concern that someone in the administration will turn on us. Israel is now a wealthy country that should gradually wean itself from its habit of asking for handouts and the dependence that creates.
The personnel issue is no less troubling. This week, Israel Hayom revealed the sharp rise in the number of mid-level commanders who want to leave the military. The IAF handles this challenge better than other parts of the service, but it is not proof against it. Without personnel with seniority, professionalism, and experience, it will have a hard time going on and staying ahead of everyone. This will require the Finance Ministry to wake up and agree to immediate changes to the professional military rubric in order to keep good people in the service. This challenge, as well as completing plans for an attack on Iran, bolstering air defenses – with emphasis on lasers – and continuing offenses and partnerships in the region, are now in Bar's hands.
Norkin was more than the IAF commander. Just like Eshel before him, Norkin was a big thinker, and didn't hesitate to speak his mind on any issue. This welcome quality should be something to take for granted in the IDF, and used to be. But with current IDF Chief Lt. Gen. Aviv Kochavi – a smart and thoughtful man – it has been played down because of Kochavi's difficulty with criticism and different approaches.
As a result, the relationship between the two ended on a sour note. Tal Lev-Ram revealed in Maariv that last year, Norkin had opposed the operation to destroy Hamas tunnels as part of Guardian of the Walls, claiming that it would be a waste of a strategic asset for the sake of a tactical result. In hindsight, Norkin was right. Still, Kochavi's decision was legitimate. What is less legitimate is the accusation that came from the Chief of Staff's office that the IAF chief or his associates were responsible for the leak.
This spat will fade out, leaving an unnecessary sense of bitterness that will nevertheless not obscure the much more important bottom line: that in the existing strategic situation, with Israel decreasingly willing to pay a price for its security, the Israeli Air Force is not just "another" force – it is THE force, a fact that comes with a cost.
