The war of attrition between Russia and Ukraine that has been going on for several months is costing Ukraine more than Russia because of its inferiority in resources and the missile attacks that have hit across the country. But Russia, too, is paying a price because wars of attrition are not cost-effective and are only employed when there is no option to wage more active warfare. Both sides would like to go on the offensive.
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There has been talk of a renewed Russian offensive going back to December, but this is where the difference between intentions and capabilities comes in. From the perspective of its battle order, the Russian army has partially solved the personnel problems that plagued it at the beginning of the war by calling up 300,000 reservists. But in terms of the weapons at its disposal, in particular light armor and artillery, the Russians suffer from heavy shortages and therefore we are seeing the formation of many light infantry regiments made up of new recruits with almost no heavy equipment. They have succeeded in creating several "regular" formations of light infantry, armored vehicles, and artillery, but they are far off their goals.
These forces are sufficient for defense and have served the Russians to stabilize the front after the Ukrainian breakthrough in the Kharkiv oblast in September of last year, but when it comes to going on the offensive the situation is more problematic. The Russian chiefs of staff have two options to go on the offensive: One is to suffice with reinforcing the efforts we have seen over the past few weeks in the Donbas along the length of the eastern front – Kupiansk, Kremmina, Lyman, Bakhmut, Avdivka, Marinka, Vuhledar – in order to eat away at the Ukrainian positions and continue with its slow but realistic advance and try to complete the political goal of taking the entire Luhansk and Donetsk regions.
A second option is to try for a more strategic and decisive move in the form of an offensive from the north or the south to break through and surround the Ukrainian force in the east and threaten Kyiv, Kharkiv, Zaporizhzhia, and other cities. But due to the shortage of weaponry, the second option would border on reckless adventurism. Russia's generals have learned from the battles over the past year that it would be more practical to prefer the first and safer option.
Looking at the situation, we can say now in retrospect that what we are seeing is in fact the major Russian offensive that we have been expecting for a long time. But the difference between intentions and capabilities can sometimes be expressed in the fact that one side in war initiates moves that it has insufficient or barely sufficient resources for. Therefore, there is a possibility that the Russians will attempt a more strategic adventure whose results are not at all guaranteed.
The Ukrainians are also preparing an offensive and for this purpose, they are building three reserve corps, each with several divisions, and are expanding the divisions of the National Guard and trying to build up their order of battle to the greatest possible extent. This process is being held up by two factors.
The first, the defense of the eastern front, around Bakhmut in particular, continues to drain the reserve forces that the Ukrainians are streaming into the area. These forces could have been used elsewhere for offensive maneuvers, but Ukraine is maintaining its political line of "not one inch" and the military is holding on wherever it has even the most remote chances of doing so.
The second factor is a shortage of weapons for all these formations; the Ukrainians are waiting expectantly for the weapons promised to them in January by the West: tanks, APCs, artillery, and so on. They have been promised enough weaponry for at least one corps, so when those weapons are delivered – the Ukrainians hope this will be in March-April-May – perhaps they will be able to transition from defense to offense. Until then their mission will be to stop the ongoing Russian offensive and any new assault if and when it arrives.
The writer is a military historian
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