The outbreak of the war on Oct. 7 exposed significant technological and management deficiencies within the Israel Defense Forces (IDF), prompting a radical shift in its approach to military technology. The prevailing paradigm proved woefully inadequate for the new reality that emerged, necessitating a rapid overhaul of military systems and procedures.
This pressing need for swift solutions has sparked a technological revolution within the IDF. The transformation, while not without its challenges, has been driven by the ingenuity and dedication of skilled engineering teams called up for reserve duty. These professionals have been tasked with delivering rapid results under intense pressure and difficult conditions.
Omer Perry, a faculty member in the Industrial Engineering and Management Department at Afeka College, shared his experience with Israel Hayom: "I received my call-up order, and within seven days, during which we barely slept, we established a system that didn't exist in the IDF before." At the behest of his commanders, Perry and his team developed an operational system within a week that continues to serve the Air Force's Aerial Defense Array to this day.
Video: Iron Dome interceptions of Hezbollah rockets near Kiryat Shemona in Northern Israel.
While specific details of the system remain classified for security reasons, it exemplifies the crucial contribution of civilian expertise to the war effort. "Our goal was to optimize processes that were previously performed almost entirely manually, which had been slowing down decision-making in the system," Perry explained.
He emphasized the critical nature of their work in the context of modern warfare: "During conflict, situations change rapidly, requiring swift analysis and decision-making. When you have a system that can automatically analyze events and present data, it dramatically improves the speed and quality of decisions, allowing for rapid problem-solving and ultimately leading to better results on the battlefield."
Perry stressed the importance of maintaining a strong core of technical professionals within the military, particularly given the ever-evolving nature of threats. He argued for the necessity of regular training for technical reservists, equating its importance to that of combat training.
"The IDF must maintain a strong core of professionals"
Perry described the dynamic reality of the current conflict, highlighting a significant shift in threats. "Previously, our main concern was missiles. Now, we're dealing with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs)," he explained. "This change has completely transformed our analytical approach within the military, requiring both cognitive flexibility and rapid adaptation of our systems. Our engineering teams have been at the forefront of this transition."
Emphasizing the practical implications, he stated "The IDF absolutely must maintain a strong core of professionals." He stressed the critical nature of this requirement, especially given the rapidly evolving threat landscape. "In an environment where threats are constantly changing, our reserve teams need to be exceptionally focused and highly skilled," Perry asserted.
"Maintaining cutting-edge technological expertise requires ongoing training for our technical reservists," he argued. "This is just as crucial as regular drills for combat troops. We must ensure our technological arsenal remains up-to-date and relevant to today's threats."
"The IDF's problem is its DNA"
Dr. Adi Fux, head of the Master's program in Engineering and Management at Afeka College, who was also called up for reserve duty as a senior officer in the Technology and Logistics Directorate, echoed Perry's sentiments. "There was no optimization of systems in the IDF at all, and everything was conducted very slowly, wastefully, and inefficiently," Fux shared.
According to Fux, the significant change that occurred in the IDF stemmed from the immediate pressure created at the start of the war. "In this war, the IDF received a gift in the form of the engineers it recruited, who are constantly under pressure, causing them to independently find engineering solutions and develop tools that the military hadn't previously considered."
"However, the IDF's problem is its DNA," he shared. "In many cases, senior commanders came to us demanding solutions while also telling us how they wanted us to achieve them. In engineering, it doesn't work that way, and we had to set very clear boundaries with top-ranking officers. They can tell us what to do, but as a professional body, we'll say how things will happen. This is a way of thinking that the IDF wasn't used to until now," he explained.
"A bureaucratic nightmare that was impossible to work with"
Fux cited an example of the inefficiency that had previously dominated some branches of technology in the IDF, which he encountered personally. "We received a 20-page protocol, a bureaucratic nightmare that was impossible to read or work with, which we were told 'was formulated by the highest ranks,'" he shared. "I had to say, respectfully of course, that I don't really care who formulated the protocol because that's not how work gets done. I passed the protocol to one of our team members, who condensed it into a concise document of about one and a half pages. This new version integrated engineering principles into the decision-making process. It's now functioning nearly flawlessly, with tangible results in the field."
"The IDF must retain the knowledge gained from the engineers"
"This conflict has made the IDF realize it must retain the knowledge gained from the hundreds of engineers mobilized during the war, even after they complete their service," Fux explained. "I believe it's now clear to everyone that we need to extend the service of engineering officers in the military. You can't preserve knowledge or develop deep learning processes when technical officers are rotated out of their positions every year or two."
Addressing the challenge of retaining high-caliber officers long-term, especially given the allure of prestigious positions in the tech industry, Fux offered a nuanced perspective. "Often, it's not about salary," he argued. "The real issue lies in the conditions under which these officers serve."
"The IDF must adapt to the realities of the modern world," Fux argued. He suggested emulating aspects of the US military model, which offers technical officers working conditions more comparable to civilian roles. "You can't expect people in their 40s and up, with families and kids, to work around the clock and constantly deal with stress and last-minute changes. We must change our approach, provide better conditions, and most importantly, give appropriate respect to technical officers as a professional body that has a crucial rule in decision-making processes," he concluded.
