The third Lebanon war has ended, assuming it won't resume when Donald Trump enters the White House in late January 2025. That's when the first phase – the test phase – of the settlement agreement between Lebanon and Israel is set to conclude.
While in Lebanon, Hezbollah celebrates its "victory" as explained by its deputy leader, Naim Qassem: "We survived the attempt to eliminate us, and therefore we are the victors," the mood in Israel is even more bitter than after the Second Lebanon War. That previous conflict began with poor intelligence about Hezbollah, insufficient missile defense systems, and doubts about ground forces' capabilities against the organization. These factors forced Israel to accept UN Resolution 1701, a "Swiss cheese resolution" that Hezbollah was clearly never going to honor.
This time, the starting point was different, yet we end this campaign with a sense of missed opportunity. Perhaps there was no alternative, but hopefully no one in Israel harbors illusions about "another Lebanon" or believes that the Lebanese government or army will want to or be able to "tame" Hezbollah, or that UNIFIL and similar forces that failed in their mission over the past two decades will succeed this time.
Rather than prophesying about the future, we should try to understand why we missed the opportunity to decisively defeat Hezbollah.
Operation Northern Arrows (which the IDF didn't even designate as a war) began unexpectedly in September 2024, and its end was equally surprising, resulting from multiple incidents along the border and developments in Israel's political arena. Consequently, the IDF entered the campaign with minimal objectives – returning northern residents to their homes – and thus with a risk-averse, minimal plan, paralyzed by the prevailing fear of Hezbollah. The campaign primarily consisted of limited friction with Hezbollah along the border and preemptive strikes against its capabilities.
However, once it became clear that the fear of Hezbollah was exaggerated, and after the dire predictions about its ability to launch thousands of missiles daily, paralyze life in Israel, and cause thousands of casualties proved false – the war's objectives and conduct should have been modified.
This primarily meant extracting a heavy price from both the organization and the Lebanese state, which cooperates with and shelters it, in a way that would break its backbone, eliminate its capabilities, and create deterrence for many years to come.
Yet Israel refrained from attacking Lebanese state institutions due to American pressure, or because some here still maintain the illusion of "another Lebanon." We should remember that voices from Lebanon suggesting all Lebanese oppose Hezbollah are merely a façade, as they neither acted nor will dare act against it.
This doesn't mean targeting Lebanon's critical infrastructure, which would have provoked criticism in Washington, but rather striking state symbols and the Lebanese army, Hezbollah's collaborator, in the organization's strongholds in the south and the Bekaa Valley.
Israel barely touched the organization's political and social wings, its institutions, and economic enterprises. Why did we wait until the eve of the ceasefire to conduct a "finale" strike against 20 targets in the heart of the Dahiyeh, instead of executing similar or more powerful attacks throughout recent months?
Finally, once it became clear that Hezbollah fighters posed no significant threat to IDF soldiers, it was both possible and necessary to deepen the ground maneuver into the heart of Hezbollah-controlled southern Lebanon.
Perhaps the political leadership had good reasons to agree to a ceasefire with Hezbollah, thereby throwing it a lifeline. Still, it's difficult to understand how our war of existence following Oct. 7 transformed into a limited, truncated military operation in the Lebanese arena. We can only hope that when the fourth Lebanon war erupts – its countdown began last week – we'll be blessed not only with remarkable warriors and excellent intelligence but also with a more appropriate planning and decision-making process.
