Following the recent publication of IDF investigations, the Shin Bet security agency released its own findings, omitting classified sections regarding intelligence tools and operational methods. In its conclusion, the Shin Bet pointed to a failure to provide the necessary warning to prevent the massacre, highlighted difficulties in recruiting human intelligence sources (HUMINT) in Gaza, a responsibility that rests solely with the agency, and pointed to improper division of responsibilities with the IDF and flawed intelligence processes. The investigation document, now public, also contains pointed, if implicit, criticism of the political leadership.
The investigations determined that the main causes of the failure were inadequate handling of intelligence on Hamas' extensive raid plan, "Operation Jericho Wall," over several years, preventing the threat from being treated as a reference scenario; lack of clear responsibility-sharing with the IDF regarding war warnings, due to the shift in Hamas from a terrorist organization to a military entity; failure to adapt counterterrorism concepts to military threats, with excessive focus on counterterrorism solutions that were unsuited to an enemy acting as an army; and gaps in information handling and intelligence integration on the night of October 7. There were also failures in working according to counterterrorism doctrine, incomplete intelligence fusion with the IDF, and absence of an effective warning model. Intelligence oversight mechanisms were found lacking, and there was a mistaken assessment that Hamas was focusing on escalating violence in Judea and Samaria rather than initiating a full-scale offensive.
Against this backdrop, the Shin Bet noted a flawed understanding of the barrier's strength and the IDF's operational readiness, a failure to sufficiently challenge Hamas' readiness through competing assessments, and a general scarcity of intelligence, exacerbated by operational limitations and increasing difficulty in independently closing the intelligence-operational loop in Gaza.
"No underestimation of the enemy, on the contrary"
In what may be seen as a subtle jab at the Israeli political leadership, the Shin Bet stated that the key factors enabling Hamas to wage war were policies that prioritized calm, allowing Hamas to amass significant power, the transfer of Qatari funds to Hamas' military wing, ongoing erosion of Israeli deterrence, reliance on intelligence and defensive measures while avoiding offensive initiatives, and the cumulative effect of disturbances on the Temple Mount, the treatment of security prisoners, and a perception of weakened Israeli societal cohesion.
The Shin Bet report clearly stated: "No underestimation of the enemy was found. On the contrary, there was deep understanding of the threat, initiatives, and a desire to thwart the threat, particularly Hamas leadership."
One of the main failures: flawed assessments of the "Jericho Wall" plan
The Shin Bet's findings align with those of the IDF, stating that Hamas' extensive raid plan, "Operation Jericho Wall," reached the agency twice, once in 2018 and again in 2022. However, these plans were not translated into reference threats, and as such were never presented as a scenario for a future campaign against Gaza. A series of "weak" signs from summer 2023 were not linked to this threat. "We identify this as one of the main reasons for the failure," the report said.
"The absence of this reference threat impaired the Shin Bet's intelligence collection direction, the understanding of information context accumulated prior to October 7, particularly in the days and hours before the attack, and hindered decision-making on the day itself."
Regarding the events of October 7, IDF investigations found that unusual activity of Hamas' communication network was flagged to the IDF around 9 p.m. on October 6. However, according to the Shin Bet report, an intelligence summary of Shin Bet southern region, disseminated around 1 a.m. on October 7, stated: "A sequence of concerning signs indicates Hamas is preparing for an attack. At the same time, field indicators suggest routine and restraint, with the background of a recently agreed 'understanding' leading to the assessment that Hamas is not interested in escalation or starting a campaign at this time."
As the weekend progressed, signs from a Shin Bet-developed technological tool prompted the agency to issue a warning at 3:03 a.m. to the IDF, police, and National Security Council, stating: "We have an indication of activation and activity of Hamas' communication network across several brigades. We lack details on the nature of the activity, though the cumulative unusual activity, alongside additional indicators, may point to an offensive action." The warning allowed for readiness adjustments but did not specify the scale or timing of the attack.
The investigation found that by 5 October, around 45 Hamas communication devices had been activated. For comparison, 38 were activated during the 2022 holidays and 37 during Ramadan 2023 - periods when Hamas ultimately did not launch attacks, though retroactively, it was revealed they had considered doing so.
Amid these warning signs, the Shin Bet director convened a 4:30 a.m. meeting with regional heads. The situation assessment included possible scenarios, such as a localized surprise raid or kidnapping, and instructions were given to prepare intelligence and operational responses. A special forces team was dispatched to the south to cover potential breach points. However, the decisions were based on incomplete intelligence, the absence of the attack plan from decision-makers' tables, limited sensor data, and unknown coverage gaps. Concerns of miscalculation were also present, with fears Hamas was preparing for an Israeli attack following its claim of responsibility for a West Bank attack. Hamas, documents later revealed, feared an Israeli strike immediately after the holidays.
Further findings pointed to professional failures in managing the intelligence operations center that night. Deploying the "Tequila" unit as a response to a localized raid scenario, overestimating the ground barrier and IDF forces, and the nature of communication between the Shin Bet and Southern Command contributed to a sense that the response matched the threat level. Additionally, intelligence fusion flaws with Military Intelligence left out two abnormal indicators identified that night.
Main reasons for the intelligence failures, according to the Shin Bet:
- Intelligence collection was hindered by restricted operational freedom in Gaza, limiting action against enemy detection mechanisms.
- Gaps in HUMINT recruitment due to limited access and remote operations, despite recovery efforts after a failed 2018 Khan Younis operation.
- The division of responsibilities between the Shin Bet and the IDF did not adapt to the evolving threat. The Shin Bet maintained that it should handle counterterrorism and terror attack warnings, while the IDF should manage war warnings.
- Insufficient rival analytical assessments, though the Shin Bet repeatedly warned about deteriorating Israeli deterrence.
- Weakening of internal oversight mechanisms.
- Professional lapses in handling accumulated intelligence.
Criticism of Israeli policy
The Shin Bet criticized Israeli policy from July 2018 until "Operation Guardian of the Walls" in May 2021, which prioritized arrangements that restrained Hamas in exchange for economic gestures, such as Qatari funds, expanded fishing zones, and entry permits for merchants. The agency saw "Guardian of the Walls" as a clear Hamas success, contrary to then-prevailing IDF views. The Shin Bet recommended proactive strategies and avoiding repeated fighting rounds in Gaza. "The Shin Bet did not assess that Hamas was deterred," the report stated, adding that the agency prepared plans to neutralize terror coordinators in Gaza directing attacks in the West Bank.
"The year 2023 was characterized by multiple Shin Bet warnings about adversaries' motivation to attack Israel, linked to societal divisions, the Temple Mount, prisons, and strategic alertness deficits, right up until the days before the massacre," the report said. However, this contradicts parts of IDF reports, which asserted that Hamas' attack decision predated Israel's internal turmoil.
The Shin Bet also noted that the possibility of Hamas engaging in strategic deception was insufficiently explored, lacking effective oversight to flag and maintain this as a credible option over time.
Shin Bet director: "I will carry this heavy burden on my shoulders for the rest of my life"
Shin Bet director Ronen Bar stated that the security agency failed to prevent the October 7 massacre. "As the head of the organization, I will bear this heavy burden on my shoulders for the rest of my life. The investigation shows that had the Shin Bet acted differently, both professionally and administratively, in the years leading up to the attack and on the night of the assault, the massacre could have been prevented. This is not the standard we expected of ourselves, nor the one the public expected of us," Bar said.
He added, "The investigation demonstrates that the Shin Bet did not underestimate the enemy. On the contrary—there was initiative, pursuit of engagement, and an effort to eliminate the threat at its inception, and yet we failed." Bar further stressed, "The path to correction, as the investigation emphasizes, requires a comprehensive pursuit of truth."
Bar also noted that immediately after the attack began, he told the agency's command that history would judge the organization based on four factors:
- Providing a warning to prevent the massacre – in this, we failed.
- Halting the attack – our personnel, those already on the ground and those who joined them, fought heroically, both alone and alongside IDF and Israel Police forces, and physically prevented a wider invasion.
- Contributing to reversing the momentum against the enemy – the Shin Bet has played a significant role in supporting the IDF and national effort, and that must remain our focus.
- The values guiding our investigation and lessons-learned process – a pursuit of truth, comradeship, and transparency.
"We are committed to making the necessary corrections to prevent, as much as possible, the recurrence of future disasters," Bar said.
