A Hamas delegation is once again arriving in Cairo, and Israel may be heading into another round of extortion by the terrorist organization.
During the three weeks of the last round, Hamas repeatedly made demands that complicated efforts to reach an agreement based on the mediators' cease-fire proposals. The Israeli side was willing to compromise at least twice: once by making concessions on the timeline for releasing the hostages, and again by agreeing to discuss ending the war. The third round of talks collapsed entirely.
Hamas' leadership was willing to take that risk because its priority is to maintain its rule in Gaza. The only model it is prepared to accept is the "Nasrallah Hezbollah model": a technocratic committee as a front, with de facto control by the "military wing" behind the scenes. Despite occasional murmurs from senior Hamas officials abroad, they have no genuine intention of giving up their weapons.
It is no coincidence that the terrorist organization demanded a broader withdrawal of Israel Defense Forces troops during the 60-day first stage of the deal, as well as the elimination of the US aid fund's role. The withdrawal would enable Hamas to exact revenge on clans that gained a foothold in the area, such as Yasser Abu Shabab's popular forces in eastern Rafah. Eliminating the fund's role is meant to restore Hamas' monopoly over supplies and the revenue from them. Whoever controls the flour and the territory controls the population, and as long as Gazans depend on Hamas for their daily needs, their loyalty will remain. Hamas has even reached arrangements with clans to seize supplies from trucks on its behalf.
Wasting precious time
As noted here last month, Hamas has spotted a weakness on the Israeli side and is working to exploit it. This is not just about the prevailing gloom at home and the whiff of elections in the air, but also about growing international pressure and the ultimatum from Western nations to recognize a Palestinian state by this coming September.
One of Hamas' favored commentators, Wissam Afifa, reflected this view when he gloated over the recent spat between Finance Minister Bezalel Smotrich and Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, as well as disputes between Israel's military and political echelons. In Hamas' eyes, time is on its side, and Israel can be squeezed to the limit. The assumption seems to be that something will eventually break and a cease-fire will be forced on Israel, without a hostage deal.
The problem is that Israel's government has played into Hamas' hands. Instead of making decisive, swift decisions, nearly a month has passed since the negotiating team returned from Qatar empty-handed. Incredibly, the cabinet convened only three days ago. It is impossible to imagine the suffering endured by the hostages during this wasted time. Meanwhile, Hamas terrorists are calmly reorganizing in tunnels, planting explosives in streets and homes, or finding new hideouts to ambush Israeli forces. This is sheer folly.
The question is: why didn't the cabinet convene immediately and make a decision, whether to apply intense military pressure or to accept Hamas' terms for a hostage deal? What were we waiting for? It is true that the terrorist entity entrenched in Gaza forces Israel into a long-term campaign - tens of thousands of terrorists cannot be eliminated in a month. But the cabinet's foot-dragging reinforces the perception that the Gaza operation is being drawn out for political reasons.
Possible solutions
Against this grim backdrop, Israel would do well to apply creative levers of pressure to make it clear to Hamas that time is not working in its favor, rather than relying solely on military force.
First, it should accelerate support for the clans and expand Abu Shabab's project from eastern Rafah to other areas. Israel must present an alternative governing model to Hamas and declare that it will transfer authority to it. True, Abu Shabab and other clan leaders are far from perfect, but the alternative is a vacuum that Hamas and its allies will fill.
Second, Israel's government must shed its aversion to the Palestinian Authority, with which it already cooperates daily. If Israel exercises some diplomatic finesse, it could declare readiness to transfer governance in Gaza to the PA under certain conditions that are likely to be rejected, such as a commitment not to incite against Israel. The goal would be to open the door to legitimacy for Arab states and the PA to support the clans more openly and extensively. Even now, Abu Shabab's forces operate with a "green light from Ramallah."
Third, it is time for an in-depth campaign against Hamas' political bureau abroad. Israel appears to underestimate the role of this body, which is responsible for fundraising, foreign relations, propaganda and remote orchestration of terrorism. As a former senior security official recently remarked, this is not a bunch of "mailmen." Hamas' overseas leaders should start paying a price for their extortion. When the sword is at their throats, another layer of pressure will be added that could lead them to capitulate.
