On the eve of the New Year, Israelis received troubling news: Israel is bleeding people outward. Instead of fulfilling the Zionist mission of bringing immigrants in, Israel has found itself exporting people, transferring human capabilities abroad and eroding the core of its national strength. A report published by the Taub Center deserves close attention to understand what happened over a 30 month period. Between January 2023 and September 2025, some 230,000 Israelis left the country, while about 70,000 returned.
In net terms, roughly 150,000 Israelis left. Some will immediately argue that this figure largely reflects people eligible under the Law of Return who are not Jewish, and will likely say quietly that this makes the phenomenon less dramatic. They would prefer to say this without looking thousands of Israelis in the eye, people in similar circumstances who contribute to society, pay taxes, increase productivity and serve in reserve duty.
But even if we exclude those not recognized as Jewish who emigrated after holding Israeli citizenship for a short period, the numbers are staggering. Over 30 months, more than 80,000 Israeli-born Jews left the country, along with more than 50,000 Jews who were not born in Israel and another 15,000 Israeli-born people not recognized as Jewish. In total, nearly 150,000 people, about 5,000 a month.
During that same period, about 60,000 people returned to Israel. The result is that in net terms, 90,000 people left within 30 months. That is equivalent to wiping a city the size of Hadera, Raanana or Modiin off the map. Given Israel's natural population growth, the past 30 months have created a negative inheritance for our children. In 30 years, they will inherit a country with 150,000 fewer Israelis. That means they will need to be more productive, serve more reserve duty and pay higher taxes.
If we are honest with ourselves and ask what kind of population is leaving, the Taub Center report offers an important clue. The destinations chosen by emigrants point to their skills and motivations.
This is not necessarily migration driven by distress. Often it is migration driven by ability. It is reasonable to assume that among those leaving are more people who, had they stayed, would have been required to pay an additional surtax on top of income tax, rather than people dependent on transfer payments and National Insurance benefits. Those who manage to open doors in competitive Western countries usually do not arrive there by chance.
This is the kind of population a country wants to import, not export. What is unfolding before our eyes is a core component of national security. When a strong population leaves, the economy suffers, the security burden is spread more thinly, and settlement, education, health care and other systems are also harmed. The civilian backbone that sustains a country's strength is weakened.
Venezuela is a painful example of how a resource rich country with a broad middle class can deteriorate rapidly once it loses its leading human layer. Even before hunger, hyperinflation and institutional collapse set in, there was a quiet departure of doctors, engineers, oil professionals, academics and entrepreneurs. This was not driven by immediate hardship but by a loss of confidence in the country's direction and in its ability to ensure a viable professional and social future.
The flight of elites preceded the collapse and accelerated it. Systems stopped functioning, human capital eroded and the state was left with resources but without the capacity to use them. The comparison with Israel must be made cautiously and with reservations. Israel is not Venezuela, and its institutions are far stronger. But the historical principle is relevant. A small country facing security, economic and demographic challenges cannot afford indifference to the cumulative departure of productive and leading groups. Ignoring the flight of human capital is not neutral. It is a strategic choice with a cumulative price, and sometimes an irreversible one.
