A similar question – one that has never been asked with the weight it deserves – is what would have happened in the Middle East had Israel had the audacity, in 2013, to eliminate Bashar Assad before the Russian-Iranian axis had entrenched itself in Damascus. Perhaps Israel could have aligned itself then with the Druze and the Kurds, shaped a new sphere of influence in the north, and prevented Iran from consolidating its grip on our border. No less important: perhaps toppling Assad would have prevented Hezbollah from establishing itself in Lebanon as a semi-state military force resting on Syrian strategic depth. The Assad regime served as a logistical, diplomatic, and military artery for the flow of weapons, experts, and advanced capabilities from Iran to Hezbollah. Severing that Syrian artery in time might have altered the balance of power in Lebanon itself and produced a regional impact far more significant than the one that followed Assad's fall in 2024 – the fall we are so fond of celebrating.
Instead, we chose in real time a "hands-off strategy," a policy of cautious waiting that left the arena in other hands. The result was the entry of Iran and Turkey into Syria, the deepening of Iran's grip around us, and the transformation of Lebanon into a free zone for building offensive infrastructure against Israel.
This is also how the concept of the Campaign Between the Wars (Israel's doctrine of low-intensity strikes to prevent enemy arms buildup) was born. For years, we told ourselves a success story: hundreds of strikes, interdictions, and the prevention of "game-changing" weapons. At the tactical level, these were indeed impressive achievements. But in parallel, the Iranian stranglehold tightened around our neck. Iran entrenched its militias, intelligence infrastructure, missile arrays, and drone networks, and deepened its hold in Syria, Lebanon, Iraq, and Yemen. This noose, tightening slowly, was presented as a containment achievement – while in practice it kept closing in. Only after October 7 did we dare call it by its name and understand the depth of the infiltration, the entrenchment, and its cost.
Israel is in love with tactical achievements. Time and again, we convince ourselves that the virtuoso tactics we display are, in fact, a strategic achievement. So it was with the "rounds strategy" against Hamas – a series of operations that yielded impressive military results. The public was sold the narrative of a deterred and weakened Hamas. In practice, we avoided a decisive blow and the decision to demilitarize Gaza back in 2014, when the cost was incomparably lower. We became addicted to tactics for a decade – and paid with strategy. The awakening on October 7 was painful accordingly.
So too in the 12-day war. A tactical, intelligence, and military achievement that demonstrated clear superiority. But immediately afterward, comforting strategic fictions were counted out to the public: the ballistic threat behind us, the nuclear threat behind us, Iran deterred. Nine months later, it became clear that it was not so. We understood – belatedly – that only regime change in Tehran will bring the story to an end. Everything else is just another round.
So too on the northern front. There too, tactical achievements against Hezbollah were presented as strategic gains. Until we woke up again to rockets over Haifa. Hezbollah, we got used to saying in recent months, is contained and deterred. But containment is not a strategy, and deterrence is not a substitute for changing reality.
Regional superiority is not measured by kinetic achievements alone – impressive as they may be – or by the targeted elimination of one leader or another. Regional superiority and political audacity are tested by the ability to produce diplomatic-strategic change. Such change demands staying power, a willingness to pay a price, and a clear understanding of strategic objectives – not point objectives.
Israel now stands before a historic opportunity that may not come again: changing reality in Iran through a change of government. This is not only about the necessary imperative to eliminate the Iranian military threat – the threat of a nuclear bomb, missiles, and proxies. Toppling the regime in Iran is critical to Israel's future because it will allow Israel to build an effective counter-bloc against the Turkey-Qatar-Pakistan axis – an axis that in the coming years could consolidate into a far more complex strategic challenge.
Israel's answer to the Muslim Brotherhood axis cannot settle for containment and prayer that the restrictions and restraints on Turkey and Qatar will be different from those imposed on Iran. Israel must aspire to anchor a clear counter-bloc: Israel-India-Greece. A bloc of sovereign, pragmatic states seeking stability and the fight against radical political Islam. Additional moderate states in the region will join it – and foremost among them, a post-war Iran. Iran, on the day after the ayatollahs – an Iran seeking to integrate into the world rather than set it ablaze – can and should join hands with Israel to counter the radical Islamist axis and become a core element in forging a strategic balance that will allow the region's stability over time. Israel and Iran found themselves on the same side in the 1960s and 1970s – a minority alliance against dangerous Arab radicalism. As then, so today.
And if the United States does not allow the staying power needed for such a change – if it again prefers short-term risk management over shaping reality – Israel must act in the arena where it has greater freedom of action. If the great devil – Iran – cannot be dealt with, at least the lesser devil – Hezbollah – must be dealt with. At the very least, Israeli leadership must not again miss a rare opportunity, one unlikely to repeat itself, for strategic change. The Israeli public is no longer buying a tactical achievement sold as a strategic one.
