Turkey is not neutral in this war. It is enabling Iran. Ankara's role is systemic: political cover, selective warning, commercial conduits, and alliance adjacency, the West still treats as harmless.
As strikes intensify, President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan condemns the campaign, aligns publicly with Tehran, rejects pressure on the regime, and preserves the channels that sustain it. Turkey prepares for spillover while preserving Iran's strategic depth. This is wartime backing.
That response is not theatre. It exposes a deeper calculation: Ankara does not need Iran to win. It needs the Iranian regime to endure. A shattered Iran would bring spillover, refugee pressure, energy disruption, market shock, and a vacuum that Kurdish armed actors could exploit across multiple borders. The assessment has long been clear: on this file, Turkish policy is driven less by sentiment than by the logic of regime continuity. Iran is a rival. It is also a regime Ankara is determined to preserve.
The Western premise misfires. Turkey is not Iran's overt ally. It is something more dangerous. Operating from within the Western security system, Ankara functions as a strategic enabler for Tehran. That is the operative reality.
The clearest example came in January 2026. Reuters reported that Turkey's National Intelligence Organization, the MIT, warned Iran's Revolutionary Guards about Kurdish fighters seeking to cross from Iraq into Iranian territory. That is not diplomacy. It is time-sensitive intelligence passed from a NATO member to a regime confronting Israel and the United States. The Kurdistan Workers' Party (PKK) file is a pretext. The channel endures. Turkey proved it will feed actionable warnings into Iran's operational cycle when required.
Nor was that an anomaly. In 2017, Turkish and Iranian officials discussed expanded military and intelligence cooperation, largely through the Kurdish file. Erdoğan spoke of joint action against Kurdish militants. The pattern is established: shared channels, working trust, routine contact, and precedent for security cooperation between Turkish institutions and Iranian power centres.
Total alignment is unnecessary. Selective convergence is sufficient. Direct transfer is beside the point. The structural reality is this: Turkey operates inside Western collection, threat mapping, and operational tempo while maintaining selective intelligence cooperation with Tehran when its interests require it. In intelligence work, proximity is power.
The air domain makes the exposure unmistakable. NATO's AWACS fleet anchors the alliance's intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) system, transmitting near real-time intelligence to air, sea, and ground forces. Turkey hosts a forward operating base at Konya. NATO surveillance flights from Turkey have shifted from Russia to Iran, with an increased tempo over Iranian territory. The exposure lies in proximity and access. A NATO platform has warned Iranian security organs and preserved multiple channels into Iran's system. This is deliberate design.
The Turkish corridor to Tehran extends beyond intelligence. It includes finance, components, logistics, and deniable infrastructure. The U.S. Treasury has sanctioned Turkey-based individuals, firms, and commercial nodes tied to Iranian sanctions evasion and to programmes linked to the Revolutionary Guards, Iran's drone effort, its missile apparatus, and defence procurement networks. This is infrastructure, not leakage. Treasury described a Turkey-based exchange house moving more than a billion dollars and euros for the Guards and Iran's defence ministry. Subsequent designations identified Turkey-linked networks supporting covert aviation, drone components, missile sourcing, and financing routes benefiting the Quds Force and Hizballah. Later measures pointed to Iran- and Turkey-based actors procuring missile-propellant ingredients from China. Reuters reported sanctions against a Turkey-based company accused of helping smuggle advanced U.S. technology to Iran through a procurement ring.
The proxy layer mirrors it. Hamas leadership operates from Turkey under political cover, coordinated with Doha, while Tehran funds and arms the axis. No overlap. Division of labour: shelter in Ankara and Doha. Weapons and escalation doctrine in Tehran.
The model extends to the Houthis. Tehran provides sponsorship and missile architecture. Turkey serves as a procurement and finance corridor. Two addresses. One supply chain.
Hizballah completes the axis. As Iran's land corridor narrowed, Turkey became a permissive node for funding, transit, and political interface. Cyprus is no longer peripheral. This week, a one-way attack drone attributed to Hizballah struck RAF Akrotiri, an EU-adjacent base. The war has crossed the Mediterranean.
This pattern is not new. Israeli concern over Turkey's trajectory predates the current war. In 2010, then defence minister Ehud Barak warned that Turkish intelligence under Hakan Fidan could pass sensitive Israeli material to Iran. In 2013, The Washington Post reported that Turkey had exposed an Israeli human network inside Iran; the report was contested. The mistrust it revealed was not.
Ankara is neither subordinate nor proxy. It acts by choice. At times, it has moved against Iranian activity on its soil. Israeli officials credited Turkey in 2022 with helping foil a suspected Iranian plot in Istanbul. In January 2026, Turkish authorities arrested suspects accused of working for Iran and surveilling NATO's Incirlik Air Base. Those facts do not cancel the pattern. They define it. Turkey functions as a valve, opening or constricting channels according to its priorities and leaving Iran with usable space.
The same selectivity defines Ankara's handling of Israeli intelligence activity. Turkish authorities detained and charged suspects accused of working for Mossad against Palestinian targets inside Turkey. The legal details are secondary. The strategic signal was unmistakable: Ankara constrains Israeli covert reach while committed to preventing the Iranian regime's collapse. That asymmetry defines the operating climate.
This exposure exists because the West misreads alliance membership as strategic alignment. It is assumed that NATO status ensured threat convergence. It does not. For Ankara, Iran is a competitor, neighbour, trading partner, energy counterpart, Kurdish interlocutor, and a regime whose collapse would damage Turkish interests. Once that hierarchy is understood, contradiction disappears. Turkey remains inside NATO while redefining alignment and preserving Iran's room to manoeuvre.
Policy must confront structural reality. It requires tighter compartmentation, stricter scrutiny of Turkey-based procurement, shipping, finance, and aviation networks, aggressive enforcement of end users, and recognition that access is strategic currency. Turkey's posture is systemic. It preserves the conditions in which Tehran can hear, move, procure, route, prepare, and endure.
The West should stop asking whether Turkey is with Iran. That is the wrong question.
The right one is this: how much of Iran's resilience is sustained by a NATO ally that has mastered strategic duality.
Shay Gal specializes in international politics, crisis management, and strategic communications, working with governments and policymakers worldwide on power dynamics, risk, and high-level decision-making.
