As the campaign in Iran progresses, it appears that the pressure bearing down on the regime has begun to produce the first fractures in its leadership. The difficulty of maintaining an orderly decision-making process – and of transmitting clear, consistent directives to forces on the ground – is only growing. With the real possibility that Israel and the US will continue the campaign and even expand it, the question arises: Does Iran still hold significant capabilities it has not yet deployed, particularly if the regime's leadership reaches a point of last-ditch desperation?
The answer is that, in terms of combat means, it is doubtful the regime holds dramatic capabilities it has not already used against Israel. The recent launch of the Khorramshahr-4 missiles – known in Iran as the Kheibar – may represent one of the last cards in the IRGC's advanced arsenal. Iran can certainly continue to challenge Israel through more intensive fire, subject to however many launchers and missiles it has remaining. But it does not possess an operational nuclear capability that could be used. Nor is a chemical weapons capability on the table – partly because of the ban that Khomeini once placed on involvement in that field. The scenario of a "dirty bomb" (a conventional explosive laced with radioactive material, not a nuclear weapon) also occasionally surfaces, but in many cases the assessments of Iran's capabilities in this area – and of the actual impact such a weapon would have – are overstated.
Even if Iran possessed such a capability, its operational utility would be extremely limited, while the diplomatic and strategic damage it would invite could be severe. In the past, there were reports that Tehran was developing "neutralizing" weapons (non-lethal disabling systems), but it is doubtful these represent a capability that could change the course of the campaign or be used in any meaningful way.
Where Iran does have genuine room to maneuver, however, is in escalating tensions across the region, above all against the Gulf states. It could attempt to strike desalination plants in those countries, alongside attacks on oil and gas production and storage facilities – a move that would cause them significant economic damage and could trigger a sharp spike in global energy prices. At the same time, Tehran could press the Houthis to embed more deeply in the campaign, intensifying pressure on the Israeli home front and potentially on the Gulf states as well.
Who should actually be worried?
Contrary to the threats emanating from Tehran, Iran does not appear to hold a game-changing weapon in its arsenal. That is not to say the threat should be dismissed: continued fire – particularly of precision missiles such as the Fateh and the Khorramshahr – still poses a significant threat to the Israeli home front. Nevertheless, Iran's most significant threat is directed not at Israel but at the Gulf states, which could find themselves paying the heaviest price if the campaign continues to escalate.
The author is a senior researcher at the Institute for National Security Studies (INSS) in Iran and the Shia Axis Program.
