When the United States and Israel launched Operation Roaring Lion, they defined their objectives with precision. "We are destroying Iran's missile capabilities and their ability to produce new missiles. Second, we are eliminating their navy. Third, we are ensuring that the world's number one state sponsor of terrorism can never obtain a nuclear weapon. And fourth, we are ensuring that the Iranian regime can no longer arm, fund, and direct terrorist armies beyond its borders," President Trump said on March 2.
From the very first moment, Netanyahu added to that list the aspiration "to create optimal conditions for toppling the regime." But neither he, Trump, Vance, Secretary of State Rubio, nor Defense Secretary Hegseth ever spoke of removing Iran's grip on the Strait of Hormuz as one of the war's objectives. That mission simply was not on the list at the outset.
Iran's stranglehold on the strait is not surprising, and it is certainly painful for the international community. It was clear that when pushed to an existential moment, Iran would deploy this lever – virtually the only effective one still at its disposal. Iran prepared for this politically, strategically, and tactically, and is acting accordingly.
On the other hand, the pressure from Western media on the Hormuz issue, and President Trump's drift toward engaging with it, are not part of his declared war plans. The president wants to lower fuel prices in the US and globally, and that is understandable. But as he himself has said, this problem belongs to "the world" far more than it belongs to the Americans. If "the world" – meaning the countries hurt by the strait's closure – wants it reopened, it needs to contribute its share. So far, that is not really happening, and that is the source of American frustration.
To date, 22 countries have declared their willingness to escort convoys through the Gulf, but those declarations have not yet been backed by action. Particularly puzzling is the passivity of the Arab Gulf states, which are being harmed by Iran even more than Israel is. Yet they are contributing nothing to the war effort.
Not only are they failing to strike back at the country that is destroying their critical infrastructure, but even on the diplomatic front, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, Qatar, and of course Oman and even the UAE are sitting largely on their hands. There are no severed ties, no recalled ambassadors, no moves at the UN, and no effort to rally other nations against Iran. Instead, there is mostly fence-sitting – a signal to Iran and to the world that, as far as they are concerned, everything remains open the day after.
It is worth asking: if even under these conditions the Gulf states are not lifting a finger to reopen the strait – the body of water they stand to lose the most from – why should others do the work for them?
There is another consideration, rooted in one of the foundational principles of Israeli security doctrine – "taking the fight to enemy territory." Rather than engaging Iran on terrain it has prepared and in an arena where it holds the advantage, the US and Israel should focus on their own strengths and on Iran's weaknesses. This is the long road that is actually the short one. In other words, everything done up to now – plus perhaps international diplomatic pressure that has not yet been fully exhausted – may be the path to breaking Iran and, ultimately, perhaps opening the Strait of Hormuz as well.
In the end, it is worth remembering that this entire war is asymmetric, and so is the battle over the strait. From the ayatollahs' perspective, "winning" this campaign requires nothing more than surviving. That is not particularly difficult when the lives of the Iranian people are not high on their list of priorities. Similarly, closing the Strait of Hormuz requires Iran to launch just one explosive drone at just one ship per day.
These are precisely the equations into which Iran is trying to drag the US and Israel – but the wisdom lies in refusing to play its game. The response from both allies must be to hold fast to the original objectives, without being swept along by Iran's provocations. The initial plan was to inflict severe damage on Iran's military capabilities, with the hope of regime change in the near or distant future, and that plan is the one to stick with. If the regime falls, the strait will open on its own – and if it does not, there will always be time to fight for it.
