How can the war with Iran end? The campaign against Iran is becoming clearer with each passing day as one that is not only failing to topple the regime, but in many respects is even strengthening it.
Iran has managed to maintain control of the maritime arena and the Strait of Hormuz, demonstrate resilience against Israel and the US, preserve a stockpile of some 440 kilograms of uranium enriched to 60%, continue striking energy infrastructure, and sustain a steady pace of missile and UAV fire, all while preventing any significant signs of internal destabilization, from protests to defections.
In other words, a series of operational achievements by the attacking side could actually lead to a worse strategic outcome. This is a dangerous paradox. Continuing the campaign in its current format does not bring its goals any closer. On the contrary, a war of attrition is precisely the strategic environment that serves Iran.
On the other hand, a significant escalation, whether a broad strike on infrastructure or a ground operation, would almost certainly lead to a severe Iranian response, causing serious damage to the global energy market and the Gulf states.
This is where the need for a diplomatic off-ramp arises. Not one that seeks to maximize gains, because Iran, feeling that it has achieved success, would not agree to that, but one focused on a single issue, the one that is truly critical: the nuclear program.
The reality must be acknowledged: As long as the Iranian regime exists, it cannot be prevented from building up conventional military power. It can be delayed, perhaps even significantly so, but it cannot prevented. The knowledge exists, the capabilities exist, and the determination exists. Therefore, the real question is not how to prevent Iran from growing stronger, but how to prevent it from becoming an existential threat. The answer to that runs through the nuclear issue.
If the enriched uranium stockpile cannot be removed by force, especially those 449 kilograms enriched to 60%, then the goal should be an agreement focused on this issue, even at the price of accepting the regime's continued existence and even its strengthening. The other alternative is to go all the way: a move aimed at toppling the regime, at enormous security, economic and diplomatic cost, and even then there is no guarantee of success.
There is no third way, and it is impossible to have it both ways. Either a nuclear-focused agreement, or a broad campaign, with all that entails.
