People were pessimistic in Jerusalem last week. The widespread assessment was that it was over in Washington. It looked like the administration had decided to return to the original Iran nuclear deal of 2015, without insisting that it be altered.
Follow Israel Hayom on Facebook and Twitter
From a place of extreme weakness, Iran played the cards it was holding very well. It kept a perfect poker face, and the US blinked first. Even if we don't go into the debate about whether the deal is good or bad, or whether Iran is more dangerous with or without it, it's hard not to wonder at how badly the Americans flubbed the negotiations, giving but not receiving anything. Even the hysteria that seized the west last week following Iran's announcement that it had started enriching uranium to 60% was odd. Not only did it comprise a flagrant violation by Iran of the deal to which it is a signatory, but also because experts were split about whether Iran even has the capability to do so in the quantities needed to make a nuclear bomb.
Given this situation, Israel has two options. First, to start an open battle against the deal, and therefore the US administration. That's what Israel did in 2015, unsuccessfully. And even worse, not only did it not manage to influence the deal, but the damage the efforts did to relations with the Obama administration and the Democratic party are still being felt. To some extent, they even influence the steps some high-ranking members of the Biden administration are taking in this round.
The second option is to try and exert influence, somehow. Leave no stone unturned, whisper in any ear, use every opportunity to talk with anyone who is anyone in the administration. This approach has little chance of success, but it's worth trying. Because Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu doesn't have the best relationship with US President Joe Biden, the ones who are leading the charge are the heads of the defense and security apparatus.
This week, Israel will launch a full-out "assault" on Washington. IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Aviv Kochavi was scheduled to arrive in Washington on Sunday [the visit was cancelled due to escalating violence from the Gaza Strip] at the invitation of the chairman of the joint chiefs of staff and meet with the commander of CENTCOM, whose territory now includes Israel, which was previously part of EUCOM and other top security officials.
As of Sunday afternoon, Mossad chief Yossi Cohen and head of the National Security Council Meir Ben-Shabbat were still slated to arrive in Washington on Monday. The two are not the best of friends, to say the least, and will be holding separate meetings. Ben-Shabbat, who has been named point man in Israel's outreach to the US administration on Iran, is supposed to meet with his US counterparts, while Cohen sits down for an operational-intelligence dialogue with his counterparts in the US security establishment, mainly the CIA. For Cohen, who will be stepping down this June, it could be his last visit to Washington as head of the Mossad after a term notable for unusually intimate relations between the Mossad and the CIA that led to an unprecedented series of cooperative actions.
Both Ben-Shabbat and Cohen's visits can be expected to focus mostly on Iran. They will try to convince their counterparts that there is no chance of Iran agreeing to what the US administration wants – that Tehran rejoin the original deal before any negotiations on extending it or making it stronger begin. "The moment the US lifts sanctions and rejoins the deal, it will be the end of the story," a senior official said last week. "Iran won't have any reason to agree to so much as a comma being changed."
As we've said, right now there appears to be little chance of changing the administration's mind. Washington has also made it clear to Jerusalem that it expects "no disturbances" to its negotiations with Iran, a pointed hint that Israel is being asked to refrain from flashy actions that are not necessary. It's likely that Israel will comply with the request, but with a footnote: that anything that puts Israel's security interests in immediate danger will be exempt, particularly weapons convoys en route to Hezbollah.
***
The IDF is following with grave concern the developments in the matter of Maj. Gilad Franco. Franco was commander of a Military Intelligence base in Beersheba when an attempt was made to enlist combat soldier Niv Lubaton as an undercover source who would inform on fellow members of his squad commanders course. Lubaton found himself in trouble, and then asked to renege on his agreement to be used as a source, and eventually committed suicide.
Franco is considered an outstanding officer, and the investigation into the matter indicates that he was unaware of the failed attempt by two intelligence coordinators at the base to recruit Lubaton as a source. Nevertheless, outgoing head of the IDF Personnel Directorate Maj. Gen. Moti Almoz decided not to promote him because his responsibilities as commander included what took place in the unit. Franco petitioned the local district court, and won, with the court ruling that the decision to remove him from his position (thereby holding up any promotions for six years, effectively meaning he would be discharged from the IDF) did not meet the criteria for plausibility; was not made based on any factual or evidentiary basis, and was disproportional. The judge in his case thought that the commander had been severely wronged because he was removed from the position of command long after Lubaton's suicide.
Subscribe to Israel Hayom's daily newsletter and never miss our top stories!
This week, Supreme Court Justice Noam Solberg rejected a request by the government to hold up the execution of the district court ruling. Solberg decided that the officer's removal and freeze on promotion were cancelled. His ruling does not mandate that the IDF promote Franco, but it requires the military to evaluate whether or not he is deserving of promotion independent of the Lubaton affair and the soldier's suicide. But this ruling creates a Catch-22 for the IDF. If the officer is promoted, facts will be established even before the main petition in the affair is decided, and if not – the army will be seen as vindictive and ignoring the rulings of two courts.
Either way, the main part of the affair still lies ahead. A panel of Supreme Court justices will be asked to decide whether or not to adopt the lower court's ruling or the military's appeal. The matter is a dramatic one, and the secondary aspect of it is just as dramatic. The first deals with the commander's responsibility, and the second addresses who decides when it comes to military appointments – commanders, or judges.
The Supreme Court rarely changes district court rulings, certainly not well-reasoned ones like the ruling issued by Judge Orna Levy. On the other hand, the government raised major considerations pertaining to the importance of commanders' responsibility. The IDF worries that if Judge Levy's ruling is not reversed in the Supreme Court, a precedent will be created for candidates for promotion to file petitions with district courts. This would chip away at the status of commanders and their decisions, and worse, at everything having to do with the words "command" and "responsibility."
It would be hard to overstate the importance of this ruling. Supposedly, it's about Franco's matter, but actually, something much more important. At a time when elected officials often serve as negative role models, the IDF must remain a moral compass. This requires it to meet the criteria set by David Ben-Gurion: "Every Hebrew mother will know that she has placed her son's fate in the hands of worthy commanders" – and instill them with real meaning, certainly in cases in which lives are lost. The Supreme Court's ruling will to a large extent determine whether or not the IDF will live up to that expectation.
