True, the terrorist who carried out last week's attack in Bnei Brak had crossed into Israel through a breach in the security fence. On the other hand, the terrorist who carried out the deadly suicide bombing in Haifa's Maxim restaurant in 2003, had entered Israel legally.
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Demands by the public to fix the breaches in Israel's security fence come from a legitimate desire for safety, but they are based on the false promises of those who built the fence. In its nature, the fence cannot completely prevent illegal entries.
Unless a barrier is closely monitored along its entire length and at all times, it cannot obstruct those who want to cross it. The Israel Defense Forces and the Israel Police never had the manpower required for this.
Unless a 700-kilometer fence is supervised by forces along its entirety continuously, it cannot entirely keep out those who wish to pass through. The Israel Defense Forces and Israel Police never had enough forces for such an undertaking.
About two years ago, I published a detailed study of the subject that maintained that the security barrier was built as a political ruse to exploit the fear of terror in order to unilaterally establish a political border.
As an obstacle, a barrier is undoubtedly beneficial to an overall effort at tactical defense. The question of its usefulness arises when this tactical tool becomes a strategic orientation. The most basic question about the barrier is how necessary it really is to prevent terrorism. The success of the IDF and the Shin Bet security agency in suppressing terrorism since the 2002 Operation Defensive Shield indicates that terrorism has been thwarted primarily by ongoing daily efforts deep in Judea and Samaria, rather than activity along the barrier.
In the ongoing debate in Israel between those who advocate for a withdrawal to the Green Line and those who propose extending sovereignty to part of Judea and Samaria, the decision to build the fence a highly significant shift in the direction of withdrawal. Its architects foresaw a solution in two stages: first, a barrier would be built with the military operating on both sides; then the IDF would be deployed only along the Israeli side of the barrier thus creating a de facto border.
The security fence is one of the most prolonged and expensive projects that Israel has ever carried out. Its cost is thus far estimated at more than 15 billion shekels (over $4 billion), and its adverse implications for Israel's future borders are of profound significance.
The budget the police and the Border police so desperately seek for additional manpower is found in the budget to repair the fence. From the beginning, the number one priority should have been to properly equip forces, as portable power is superior.
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