Tell me who your opponents are and I will tell you what path you are on – that is the point of view required to understand the strategic direction Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Avigdor Lieberman are pursuing when dealing with Hamas, the terrorist group that rules the Gaza Strip.
I am not privy to the discussions, nor am I an official spokesman, which is precisely why I can analyze the logic behind the government's actions.
Those who oppose striking an agreement with Hamas have various interests, and we must distinguish between opponents from within the Israeli political sphere, such as Opposition Leader Tzipi Livni (Zionist Union), and external opponents, primarily Palestinian Authority President Mahmoud Abbas.
Despite the differences between them, both sets of opponents see a potential deal with Hamas – one that would exclude the Palestinian Authority – as a threat to the two-state solution.
Both also share the basic assumption that when it comes to Gaza, especially in security matters, Israel must work with the Palestinian Authority.
This is the strategic fork to the new path Lieberman and Netanyahu are trying to forge. Their move is based on a new logic, which sees maintaining the separation between the Hamas regime in Gaza and the Palestinian Authority in Ramallah as an Israeli interest.
If there is a new strategy in play, why doesn't Netanyahu come out and say so?
The sobering answer is that that here in the Middle East, it is best to maintain ambiguity.
Any strategy has always been only as strong as its covert aspects, which can often significantly outweigh their overt counterparts.
True shrewdness in wheeling and dealing will often play out as an unnecessary concession or even a perceived loss.
We must remember, though, that sometimes the need to keep motives hidden can take away from the ability to provide a convincing response to those who oppose what they cannot see and focus on what they can.
Over the past week, Livni has been lambasting the Egyptian-led efforts to reach a long-term cease-fire between Hamas and Israel – efforts that exclude "moderate" Abbas – saying that this is highly detrimental to the two-state solution.
The split between Gaza and Ramallah is indeed an obstacle in the path of the 25-year-old Oslo Accords, but it is also an opportunity for those who wish to extricate themselves from the Oslo route and embark on a new path.
Those who insist on sticking to the Oslo path insist that Israel faces great threats unless it retreats to the 1967 lines, warning that "either there will be no Jewish state or there will be no democratic state."
But they ignore the fact that since 1993, there have been developments that call for a critical re-examination of the situation.
It is quite possible that Israel will have no choice but to scale itself back to a narrow coastal strip. This would make it difficult for it to survive, not only in light of security challenges but also with respect to the physical aspects required for its growing population.
Even if the IDF could properly protect a state within the 1967 borders for now, as those opposing the prime minister's approach say, how can they be so sure this will be the case in the decades to come?
It is worth listening to Abbas, who believes the new moves are detrimental to the Oslo process. If both he and Higher Arab Monitoring Committee head Mohammad Barakeh oppose these moves, there is surely a basis for hope among those who say we should explore the new options toward the Palestinians.
When crafting strategic processes, potential opportunities can emerge from actions that seem to counter logic. It is time to explore avenues different than the ones set in the early 2000s by then-President Bill Clinton's peace plan. Extracting Israel from that plan is a prominent Israeli interest, which surprisingly, may be served best by reaching a deal with Hamas.
