The attention of governments from around the world is fixed firmly on Russia's ongoing invasion of Ukraine, deciphering the lessons that can be learned from the conflict and its surrounding diplomatic struggles. This is true for those states directly involved, and those that are not.
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Probably the most important issue – and one that is not receiving the attention it deserves – is the position of vulnerability that Ukraine put itself in by agreeing to disarm its nuclear arsenal when it gained independence in 1991.
As the USSR broke apart in 1989, Ukraine found itself negotiating independence with an inheritance of thousands of Soviet nuclear weapons on its territory. This included Inter–Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs).
While the new state had physical control of these doomsday weapons it did not have launch control for them. Nevertheless, Ukraine as a technologically advanced country that had contributed to the development of the Soviet arsenal likely could have unlocked the weapons with 6–18 months of concerted effort, analysts suggest.
But it decided not to. Nuclear weapons were considered a tool of war and the issue of keeping them as a means of deterrence – against either the West or Russia – was never seriously discussed at the highest levels. The disarmament decision flew in the face of Western, and particularly US, expectations: Ukraine's position as a weaker, threatened state parked next to Russia necessitated a deterrence factor to balance its security needs, it was assumed.
Still reeling from the aftershocks of the 1986 Chernobyl disaster, and looking at the financial burden of maintaining and servicing thousands of nuclear devices – many nearing the end of their lifespan – Ukraine decided instead to denuclearize. As well as saving money the decision bought Ukraine favor with the West, especially the US which provided cash incentives to disarm.
The difficulties Ukraine encountered separating from the Soviet Union – now the Russian Federation – created the necessity for Ukraine to trade returning the nukes for divorce from the Kremlin, which was reluctant to allow secession. Ukraine never developed a doctrine of deterrence – not among its academics, politicians or military leaders – that could have informed more forcefully of the benefits of keeping and learning to control some of these weapons.
In the end, in 1994, after returning all the weapons it held to Russia or dismantling them, Ukraine joined the Treaty on Non–proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, as a non–nuclear weapons state. An international treaty known as the Budapest Memorandum was formulated under the auspices of the Organization for Security & Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). It was signed by Russia, the US, the UK and three former nuclear armed, Soviet republics – Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Ukraine.
In return for surrendering their arsenals, the territorial integrity of the three newly independent states was guaranteed by the other signatories. Because of the circumstances at the time, primarily the desire to prevent nuclear proliferation under considerable time pressure, the agreements were based on mere assurances rather than firm commitments.
The flaws in this rushed timeline were made evident in 2014, when Russia invaded Crimea – but strangely enough not much fuss was made over the infraction, though most parties other than Russia agreed it was a clear breach of the treaty.
And, other than the international sanctions imposed on Russia – ongoing and recently jacked up substantially – there were no penalties on the Kremlin's dishonoring of its previous diplomatic commitments.
This must lead to the assumption that Kyiv likely regrets its 1991 decision to denuclearize. Irrespective of the asymmetry in conventional forces between Russia and Ukraine, if the latter possessed even a small number of nuclear weapons, it probably would not now be suffering under invasion right now.
Lessons for Iran
What then are the implications of Ukraine's misjudgment for the present attempt to renegotiate the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) with Iran? There are three main concerns –
One, a country must discuss its nuclear standing in-depth, over time and with the required expertise at political, military, and academic levels, as difficult as that may seem in view of the confidential nature of the subject matter.
Two, what happened to Ukraine drives home to any country that is a non–nuclear neighbor of a nuclear-armed power, that its sovereignty can never be taken for granted. Iran is certainly in the Russian Federation's close neighborhood with a history of turbulent relations between the two nations. This will not be lost on the Iranian leadership.
Three, the most problematic concern under the circumstances, is that the two major powers that are supposed to guarantee the renewed JCPOA are the US and Russia. The US already broke its commitments to Iran once, after then-president Donald Trump withdrew from the accord. And Russia is breaking its commitments to Ukraine under the Budapest Memorandum even as we speak.
It must therefore be reasonably assumed that whatever agreement is signed – if it is signed – will not be ironclad, if the guarantors cannot be relied upon. Something that Iran can see.
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Therefore, whether Tehran will construct a nuclear weapon depends principally on its own perception of deterrence, and not on the signing of a disarmament agreement with the US and other powers.
Ukraine had the capacity to establish itself as a nuclear state and chose not to do so of its own volition. Iran has the choice to stay within the limitations of the restrictions imposed on it by a renewed JCPOA or to acquire a bomb.
While we can by no means assume that a nuclear Iran is a foregone conclusion, looking at what is happening in Ukraine would suggest that avoiding this scenario will depend on Iran rather than any agreements that it signs.
This article was first published by i24NEWS.
