The ceasefire imposed on Israel in Lebanon, like the previous one in 2024, does not serve our vital interest: dismantling Hezbollah's terrorist army.
That can be achieved only through the occupation of extensive territory in Lebanon, the evacuation of the population and a sustained military offensive. This moment in the war against Iran therefore exposes a gap in interests between Netanyahu's Israel and Trump's US.
But this gap between the allies is not similar to the one that drove the US to impose a ceasefire at the end of 2024. At that time, the US under the Biden administration sought to put the genie back in the bottle and preserve an imagined status quo in the Middle East, one whose meaning was neither conservative nor balanced, despite the illusions of the Democratic Party in the US. That would have allowed Iran to continue advancing its imperialist plan to take over the region under the cover of violent proxies, nuclear weapons and an overt genocidal threat. Biden's US, after all, wanted to prevent the regional war that Trump's US embarked on last summer, and even more forcefully in recent weeks.
By contrast, the gap between Netanyahu and Trump is probably not wide. It concerns timing between the fronts, and also an American overestimation of the possibility of reaching a proper agreement with the Islamist regime, and of the possibility of dismantling Hezbollah and Hamas through an agreement. In Netanyahu's eyes too, no less than in Trump's, the vital interest of stripping Iran of nuclear weapons comes before any other interest. Handing over the enriched material, a ban on enrichment and the final dismantling of the nuclear facilities are therefore at the core of the interest that guided the alliance between them. But Israel does not want to find itself in a situation in which the Islamist regime survives in Iran by pledging to do things it has no intention of doing, while also managing to preserve the survival of its main proxy, Hezbollah.
Moreover, by linking a ceasefire with Iran to a ceasefire with Hezbollah in Lebanon, when the "expelled" Iranian ambassador is the one announcing it to Hezbollah, the US and Israel are recognizing Iran's Lebanese legion's occupation of the country. This is the opposite of the demand that Iran stop undermining the sovereignty of the region's states and withdraw from its imperialist plans. Thus Lebanon's effective subordination to Iran through Hezbollah renders the negotiations between Lebanon and Israel meaningless.
But Netanyahu had no choice, for now, but to comply with Trump's demand. Already now, the Democratic Party in the US is accusing Trump, unjustly, of being dragged along by Netanyahu. Had Netanyahu insisted on continuing the offensive in Lebanon now, first he would have caused serious political damage to his ally; second, Israel would have been accused of prolonging the war without the decisive achievement that is also critically important to it, the elimination of the Iranian nuclear project. Third, eliminating that project, and perhaps also the gradual elimination of the Islamist regime, are indeed goals Israel can and does want to advance on its own, but success in advancing them depends to a great extent on the US. Israel will therefore try to avoid a confrontation with it.
That is probably Netanyahu's main consideration at the moment. But even in light of the forced ceasefires in Gaza and Lebanon, his position is not bad. The principle that Israel will not tolerate the existence of any terrorist army on its borders is receiving clear American reaffirmation, to the point of legitimizing strikes when necessary, and the Americans are gradually instilling this principle in the world's nations. Therefore, the assessments that Israel will face diplomatic difficulty in resuming attacks in the north and in the Gaza Strip are unfounded.
At the same time, these ceasefires have exposed a military difficulty: the weakness of the senior ground command, as distinct from the forces themselves. After a brilliant air-intelligence offensive, the Israel Defense Forces limited itself to relatively minor missions in southern Lebanon. Even after many long weeks, it did not even capture all the territory up to the Litani River. The moves made by the current General Staff are heavy and devoid of imagination, just like those of the previous General Staff, and that is cause for concern for the future.
