Social media and media outlets were replete with calls to assassinate Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar. This was a natural, instinctive response to the shocking Independence Day attack in Elad and likely representative of the opinion of a majority of Israelis.
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Sinwar is a bitter enemy and a tough ideological rival. His words and actions are evil, and as a result, he is a dead man walking. Yet decisions on targeted killings must not be made according to gut feelings and a desire for revenge. They must be made intelligently and with the understanding that the killing is not the final but rather the first stage in a campaign. Immediately after his assassination, a military campaign will be launched that we must be prepared for, as Israel was when it took out Hamas military leader Ahmed Jabari in 2012 in an operation that led to Operation Pillar of Defense. We must also be prepared for the situation in the Gaza Strip to remain unchanged when it is all over.
Israel has a long history of targeted killings, just a few of which served to dramatically change the reality on the ground. It happened to the Palestinian Islamic Jihad following the assassination of its leader Fathi Shaqaqi in Malta in 1995. Shaqaqi's killing sent the terrorist group into a state of paralysis from which it would only recover in the Second Intifada in 2000. It happened to some extent to Hamas in 2004, when it requested a long-term ceasefire with Israel following a series of targeted killings of Hamas founder Sheikh Ahmed Yassin and Abdel Aziz al-Rantisi.
On the other hand, the killing of Hezbollah co-founder Abbas Mussawi in 1992 brought the world Hassan Nasrallah, who turned out to be a far more charismatic and dangerous leader than his predecessor. Jabari's assassination, along with the assassination of other Hamas officials, did not do anything to change Hamas' behavior. It certainly did not deter it from continuing its struggle against Israel. It taught Israel's diplomatic-security echelon an important lesson: Targeted killings are an important tool that should be used at times but are no miracle cure and are certainly not a substitute for strategy.
Israel in recent years has had quite a few opportunities to take out Sinwar. His assassination has been raised a number of times in discussions, in particular by the former head of the Shin Bet security agency Nadav Argaman. Argaman reasoned that Sinwar had amassed an unusual level of power and influence that demanded his removal from the equation. His proposals to this end were repeatedly rejected by former Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, who preferred dialogue with Hamas in an attempt to secure a long-term ceasefire.
The current government has thus far opted to continue along the same lines. This stems, among other things, from the fact that Hamas has succeeded in keeping Gaza almost entirely quiet over the last year and relayed messages through every possible means that it does not want an escalation. The thinking on the Israeli side was that an investment in the civilian, economic aspect – whether through projects, allowing Gazan workers into Israel, expanding operations at border crossings, and expanding permitted fishing zones off Gaza's coast – was the best way to prevent war as it ensured the Gazan public would pay a price and would therefore urge Hamas to maintain calm.
Hamas did indeed conduct itself in this manner, but at the same time, Sinwar succeeded in putting himself in charge of all the terrorism perpetrated outside of Gaza. It's an impressive achievement given that the organization has not had anything to do with any of the attacks carried out in recent weeks. Nevertheless, in the public conscience, the achievement is Sinwar's. Sinwar has become a hero of the Palestinian street, and as such, the immediate target of Israelis' rage.
Sinwar is an unusual figure who has managed to acquire significant power. This stems from the fact that he is one of the "founding fathers" of Hamas, his having served time in an Israeli prison, his religious fanaticism, and his significant charisma. These are significant reasons for his assassination, which would be a complicated operation as part of a military campaign but less complicated in routine time, but they will not change Hamas. And while we're on the subject of targeted killings, there is at least one other senior official in the organization that should be reunited with his virgins – Saleh al-Arouri, Hamas' politburo chief and the main driver of Hamas terrorist activity in Judea and Samaria and overseas, including the rocket fire from Lebanon last month. Al-Arouri splits his time between Turkey and Lebanon, and his neutralization would be a difficult blow to Hamas' military operations outside of Gaza, which have gained dangerous steam in recent years.
Assassinations at the level, and certainly that of Sinwar, demand advanced preparations for the escalation that ensues, as well as the day after. At the same time, on a tactical level, Israel must take care of a few issues that have arisen following the Elad attack. The first is the need to deepen IDF activity in northern Samaria, which has once again become a hotbed of terrorism. The second is the breaches in the areas east of the Green Line and west of the Jerusalem-adjacent security fence otherwise known as the Seam Zone, which have once again allowed terrorists to far too easily infiltrate the Green Line. The third issue concerns the need to contend with the drivers, lodgers, and employers who serve as a permanent and dangerous platform for Palestinians inside Israel illegally.
Recent years have shown us that Palestinians working in Israel legally distance themselves from terrorism out of concern their income will suffer, and their role in attacks has been minor to date. On the other hand, the role played by Palestinians residing in Israel illegally is far more significant, and as a result, this issue must be dealt with immediately. As Israel is in need of manpower, in particular in the construction field, it must find a way to authorize more work visas while closing the breaches that allow Palestinians to enter Israel and work here illegally.
One of the victims of the Elad attack may have paid with their life for driving the terrorists to the Haredi community, but the problem must be dealt with at the root. Avoiding this, in particular on the part of employers who prefer to pay workers under the table, is a certain recipe for disaster and the next attack. This is a lesson that has been known for years, but the time has come to implement it through cooperation with all those involved and harsher punishments for those who act in violation of the law, thereby putting public security at risk.
One more note on strategy: The government must now decide whether and how to respond to the Elad attack. It must do this as it finds itself in a complicated political situation and under immense public pressure. The temptation is to send a missile over to Sinwar and say goodbye to him for good. Before this is greenlighted, though, the ground must be set for the day after and the military campaign that could demand the entrance of ground forces and casualties on our end, the accompanying diplomatic and public diplomacy campaign, and in particular, the day after, when we discover once again that Gaza isn't going anywhere.
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