A Washington-based think tank said Wednesday that Syria may be building a new, underground nuclear facility, but stressed that as satellite images of the activity in the site's suspected area are inconclusive, the purpose of the site remains unknown.
The Institute for Science and International Security issued its review just hours after Israel officially claimed the 2007 bombing of a suspected nuclear reactor in Al-Kubar, in the Deir ez-Zor region in eastern Syria.
In a statement on its website, the Institute for Science and International Security said that the Qusayr site in western Syria "warrants inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency, even though accomplishing such inspections may have to wait until the Syrian conflict ends," and warned that "any nuclear-related facility in Syria could involve considerable assistance from North Korea, given that Pyongyang provided extensive assistance in the construction of the Al-Kubar reactor."
The review of the issue, penned by former IAEA official David Albright together with Sarah Burkhard, Allison Lach and Frank Pabian, said that the institute decided to "revisit a series of claims made in a 2015 Der Spiegel report regarding the Qusayr site in Syria," and noted that Israel's action in 2007 "serves to highlight once again the lack of accounting for Syria's past nuclear weapons program and the location of any assets remaining from that program.
"This includes possibly tens of metric tons of uranium fuel and other equipment or materials associated with nuclear fuel fabrication and plutonium separation, that likely existed as key elements of the Al-Kubar reactor project."
Available satellite images of the Qusayr site show three buildings that appear to be hiding underground. While the images do not provide any concrete information about the purpose of the site, it may hold nuclear or nuclear-related materials and equipment, or serve other military purposes.
The review said that building a nuclear reactor that is fully located underground "is not impossible," and that an engineering challenge of this nature "would likely require secret, ongoing assistance from North Korea. Similarly, an enrichment plant would require extensive foreign assistance, likely from North Korea or possibly from Iran, since there is no available evidence of Syria buying the necessary equipment and materials from abroad."
Understanding Pyongyang's role in Syria's pursuit of a nuclear program is extremely important as the United States weighs the prospects of negotiations with North Korea, the institute said.
