Twenty-seven minutes. That is how much time passed between the Israeli military informing the Russian army of its plan to strike Iranian assets in the Syrian port city of Latakia and the downing of a Russian reconnaissance plane carrying 15 crew members by Syrian anti-aircraft fire trying to counter the strike.
The incident, and especially its timeline, encapsulates the issues of Israeli-Russian coordination, safety margins, Syrian amateurism and Russian callousness, especially given that the information relayed to the Russians through the deconfliction channel between IDF headquarters in Tel Aviv and the Russian command and control center at the Hmeimim air base in Syria includes much more than just notifications about strikes – it entails exact times, locations and flight paths.
The Russians had plenty of time to prepare. More than 10 minutes passed between the notification of a pending strike and the strike itself, and 15 more minutes went by before Syrian anti-aircraft fire downed the Russian plane. The Russians had plenty of time to ensure their aircraft would be out of harm's way and to coordinate with the Syrian army.
That was not done, and a furious Kremlin announced plans to deploy advanced S-300 air defense systems in Syria and give Syrian President Bashar Assad's forces advanced identification systems to help them better understand who is flying in their skies.
Israel was taken aback by Russia's rage over the incident and the overt hostility that followed.
Hopes that this was a case of fake fury that would soon pass were quickly replaced with serious concerns. Some irresponsible lawmakers were quick to declare that Israel should "put Russia in its place" and show it "who's the boss" in the Middle East, but the top political and military echelons were wiser.
The differences between Israel and global superpower Russia are clear, said one of the officials who participated in the discussions. All Russia has to do is merely suggest imposing sanctions on anyone who trades with Israel – as the U.S. has done to Iran – and Israel folds immediately.
Sanctions of any kind are not really an option, as Moscow has no interest in crippling Israel. However, it does wish to put Israel in its place and have it follow the rules – that is, Russia's rules in the Middle East.
The Kremlin was never a fan of the Israeli strikes in Syria, not out of fear that Russian soldiers might be hurt but out of concern that these strikes might compromise its regional position. For the most part, however, it was willing to look the other way.
Israel spares no effort to ensure no harm came to Russian troops in Syria, but the perception is clear: If Israel is raiding targets near Russian forces with alleged impunity it means either that Russia does not care or that it has no interest in putting a stop to that. Either way, Russia looks bad.
But the Russian game is wider than the Israeli-Syrian story. It is aimed at Washington. It is not for nothing that immediately after Russian Defense Minister Sergei Shoygu announced that Syria was getting S-300 missiles, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov announced that he was prepared to discuss the issue with the United States.
The intention behind Lavrov's statement was clear: If American forces withdraw from Tanf in eastern Syria, Russia will reconsider providing the Assad regime with advanced missiles.
The truth is out there
Israel may be able to influence these moves, but in a different way than previously thought.
If until the Latakia incident it was believed that Israeli-Russian ties could weather anything, especially given the personal relationship between Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Russian President Vladimir Putin and the coordination between the two armies, recent developments have proved that Russia prioritizes its own interests, followed by Syria's interests – as it wants to benefit from the war-torn country's economic rehabilitation – and only then does it consider other factors, such as Israel's security interests.
Israel must go back to the basic assumption that the United States is the only superpower that will provide it with security support. Coordination with the U.S. is critical, especially in cases in which a superpower's back-up is required.
It was fascinating to observe the back-and-forth between Jerusalem and Moscow this week, especially regarding the chain of events that led to the downing of the Russian plane.
Israel asserted that there was no connection between its strike in Syria and the Russian plane's downing, blaming the Syrian anti-aircraft fire alone.
Russia would not hear of this, claiming that this was a case of the domino effect: The Israeli raid sparked the Syrian fire that brought down the plane. Ergo, had Israel not attacked, the plane would not have been shot down.
But the Russian theory ignores the actual catalyst: Iran's operations in Syria.
Moscow is by no means a fan of Iran's presence in Syria, but it simply refuses to accept any explanation that does not hold Israel fully responsible for the incident.
Syrian President Bashar Assad and the Syrian forces, whose amateurism cost the lives of 15 Russian crewmen, are for some reason exempt from blame in the Kremlin's eyes. The Iranians are not to be blamed either. Everything begins and ends with Israel.
This is troubling on many levels, especially with regard to the future outlook in the region.
Netanyahu and IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Gadi Eizenkot have invested considerable efforts in establishing the Israeli-Russian deconfliction channel. For three years, this mechanism worked seamlessly, allowing Israel to strike Syria when necessary while getting along with the Russians.
This era is over. All we can do now is give thanks that this did not happen sooner and do everything to avoid a recurrence.
A similar incident could occur at any time, because all parties are literally playing with fire.
As far as we know, the Israeli Air Force has not operated in Syria since the incident, although that could change at any moment. The Iranians, who have paused to re-evaluate the situation, will soon resume their military entrenchment efforts in Syria as well as their efforts to arm Hezbollah in Lebanon, and they may choose to do both in a way that increases the chances of Israeli-Russian friction.
This means every future Israeli operation in Syria will be twice as sensitive, and not just because it may encounter improved Syrian defenses, potentially aided by Russian jamming efforts. Even today, any raid on targets in Syria is very carefully scrutinized and involves the highest echelons up to the prime minister, but the long string of successes – over 200 strikes in two years – has naturally created a perhaps excessive sense of self-confidence.
But no more.
Still, overall, the balance is favorable. Thanks to the IDF's operations, two years after making a strategic decision to cement its presence in Syria, Iran has no port in Latakia and no airbase in Homs, and no real bases or intelligence facilities to support its proxy militias.
Along the way, the Israeli intelligence and aerial mechanisms have been honed and officials from all over the world travel to Israel to learn from the Israeli Air Force.
Israel is something of a superpower when it comes to operating behind enemy lines. Everyone knows this, which may also explain some of Moscow's ire.
