The tensions in South Caucasus seem not to decrease after the Second Karabakh War in 2020. This time, the actor, who increase the tensions, is Iran. After the Azerbaijani victory, Turkey and Israel could strengthen their place and posture in the region thanks to the alliance with Baku. Even Russia, which brokered the ceasefire agreement between Azerbaijan and Armenia, could find a place in the new status quo, while it is busy with its peacekeeping force in Nagorno-Karabakh. However, the limits and duties of this force remain ambiguous.
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Thus, Iran, which is excluded from the new balance of power in the South Caucasus, is frustrated and angry. Despite Erdoğan's call for a six-membered platform (with the participation of Ankara, Moscow, Baku, Tbilisi, Yerevan, and Tehran) in June 2021, and Aliyev's peaceful discourse vis-à-vis Iran in Khodaafarin in 2020, Iranian authorities chose to provoke a conflict with their northern neighbor. Iranian discourse is indeed really severe. Iran has been supporting Armenia since the 1990s (Yerevan recently acknowledged Iranian support) and transporting goods to the so-called Republic of Nagorno-Karabakh via Azerbaijani territory illegally.
Azerbaijani reaction has had a legal base and was righteous while arresting Iranian drivers who entered that territory. But Tehran acted so harshly against Baku that it is impossible not the see the real reasons behind its reaction.
Firstly, Iran is not accepting the results of its acts: Its support for Armenia and rejection of the new status quo resulted in exclusion from regional affairs. Secondly, Iran is against Israel's -and Turkey's- relations with Azerbaijan. Tehran's allegations of the Israeli base in Azerbaijan demonstrate the level of its discomfort and paranoia. Finally, one might think that Russia used the Iranian reaction to build a platform with six states in the region, in parallel with Turkey's previous proposal. In this way, Moscow could create (again) a balance of power, which is not in favor of Baku and Ankara.
A final point is the timing of the Iranian reaction. For more than two months, Azerbaijan and Turkey are trying to build regional stability and security by offering an olive branch to Armenia. The calls from Ankara and Baku, especially from Baku, show the aspiration for peace and stability, despite the horrors of the past.
Secondly, the recent developments in Azerbaijani-Israeli relations are showing us that the opening of the Azerbaijani embassy in Israel is very soon. While Iran is not happy with the nature of these relations, its actions merely reduced the time for the long-awaited opening. Despite very close relations since the collapse of the Soviet Union, Azerbaijan has not opened an embassy in Israel. However, as the recent statements from Azerbaijani officials show, a historical moment in the history of the South Caucasus and the Middle East is close.
Iran can not take a risk in going to war with Azerbaijan, which is fully supported by Israel and Turkey. While Russia is trying to increase its gains in the game of power, we can not say that it will let Iran spark a military conflict in the region. That's why the Iranian war game is just a replication of what Russia did near the Ukrainian border in April 2021. However, Iran does not have the resources and power Russia has ever had. With tens of millions (according to various estimations) ethnic Turks living in Iran, Tehran could not venture a war against Azerbaijan and Turkey.
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Here, there is another issue, which involves Israel and Turkey. While Ankara and Baku pursue almost the same and common foreign policy goals, one of their rare difference is the relations with Israel. However, if Tehran continues to provoke any conflict with Azerbaijan, it is not impossible to think that Israeli and Turkish ministries of defense and other officials act together. The already-established communication between the two countries could facilitate the rapprochement thanks to Iran.
Oğul Tuna is a Ph.D. student at the University of California, Irvine and a columnist at the Independent Turkish (Independent Türkçe).
