Hostages. An investigation by the Shin Bet security agency into a member of the Gaza-based Mujahideen group led to the discovery and recovery of the body of a Thai national who had been abducted from Kibbutz Nir Oz. This followed the recent location and repatriation of the bodies of the Israeli couple Judy Weinstein Haggai and Gadi Haggai.
Unlike the Haggais, who were murdered during their abduction on October 7, the Thai national was kidnapped alive and later murdered in captivity, just like Shiri Bibas and her two sons, Ariel and Kfir, who were also held by the Mujahideen group. At least one more hostage body remains in the group's possession, and it appears that they executed all the captives they held.
The recovery of the hostage was made possible thanks in part to the Israel Defense Forces' control of the area, which enables relatively free movement to conduct searches. In the ongoing debate over whether military pressure jeopardizes or advances the fate of the hostages, this outcome supports the latter. Still, a broader view provides a clearer perspective: during the war, 41 hostages who were alive when abducted have been killed in Gaza.
Earlier, Hamas spokesman Abu Obeida claimed that IDF forces were closing in on hostage Matan Zangauker, and that ongoing operations were endangering his life. While it's true that military pressure can threaten the lives of captives - former hostage Edan Alexander said he was saved during an IDF strike - this latest statement appears to be psychological warfare, signaling the stress Hamas is under.
Even if Israel succeeds in recovering a few more bodies, it cannot resolve the overall hostage crisis without a negotiated deal. Despite recent optimism from Qatari mediators, it seems that the parties are still far from an agreement. The true indicator of progress will be the arrival of US envoy Steve Wietkopf to the region, a visit that has yet to materialize.
Combat. The delay in reaching a deal has prompted the IDF to intensify and expand its operations in Gaza, aiming to achieve several goals: to take control of additional areas and dismantle infrastructure, especially tunnels and weapons caches; to target Hamas operatives and both its military and civil systems; to increase civilian reliance on humanitarian aid from non-Hamas sources; and to gain leverage in hostage negotiations, for example, through the recovery of high-value "assets" like the body of Muhammad Sinwar, found in a tunnel beneath the hospital in Khan Younis where he was killed and subsequently brought to Israel.
These operations proceed slowly, in an effort to minimize casualties among IDF troops. Whenever possible, airstrikes or long-range fire are used, but sometimes close-quarters encounters are unavoidable, especially when searching for strategic tunnel shafts.
Hamas has learned to exploit this vulnerability and now rigs buildings with explosives designed to detonate as troops approach. The IDF uses a range of tools to detect these traps but does not always succeed, as demonstrated by Friday morning's incident in which four soldiers were killed and five more wounded.
Such risks are inherent in this type of anti-terror warfare, where the enemy does not act as a conventional military force and instead seeks out weaknesses to exploit. Given the IDF's cautious, methodical approach, it inevitably presents such vulnerabilities. In recent days, various units have complained about unnecessary daytime logistical movements in unarmored vehicles. These operations usually end without incident, but last week's casualty count should prompt Southern Command to better prioritize and execute missions.
Proxy. As part of efforts to reduce risks to its troops, Israel is reportedly relying on a local organization opposed to Hamas. Israeli MK Avigdor Lieberman revealed Thursday that the group has received weapons, and likely funding as well. In exchange, it carries out various security tasks that serve to create a buffer between Hamas and the IDF, implicitly reducing friction between the two.
The Prime Minister's Office confirmed the details but claimed their disclosure endangered Israeli forces. That may be true in the immediate term, but history shows that in the longer run, arming a hostile force often backfires. Israel has a well-documented track record of such missteps, from supporting Hezbollah as a counterweight to the Palestine Liberation Organization in Lebanon and backing the Gemayel brothers' presidential bid, to helping establish Hamas to counter Fatah, creating the so-called "village leagues," and other affairs, all of which ended in at best tactical damage and, in some cases, severe strategic setbacks.
The local organization Israel now leans on is likely to become addicted to power and money, eventually morphing into a rebranded version of Hamas. A better course would have been to turn to a known quantity, the Palestinian Authority, with which Israel has cooperated relatively successfully over the past two decades in counterterrorism operations.
The Palestinian Authority has both weaponry and international legitimacy. In addition to combating Hamas, it could have assumed responsibility for humanitarian aid, relieving Israel of that burden. Such a move would have earned Israel significant diplomatic dividends, helping to ease global criticism and stave off boycotts. Yet Israel has avoided this route for purely political reasons that run counter to its broader national interests.
