The demonstrations challenging Iran's worsening economic conditions are testing a regime that has struggled to find solutions capable of pulling the economy out of its current mire. Still, the Islamic Republic has confronted internal challenges more serious than the present one, making it premature to conclude that the protests will lead to regime change, particularly given the lack of an organized opposition that could serve as an alternative to the existing order.
Israel and the West should be careful not to appear as if they are intervening in these protests. Such moves would only bolster the regime's long-standing claim that demonstrations are the result of foreign interference. If, however, the protests persist over time across large parts of Iran, force the regime to deploy extensive violence, and even lead to dramatic developments at the top of the system, including the removal of President Masoud Pezeshkian, it would then be clear that the Iranian regime is facing an exceptionally serious challenge to its stability.
In recent days, protests in Iran have intensified in response to austerity measures included in the proposed state budget of Pezeshkian's government and against the backdrop of the country's deteriorating economic situation, particularly the collapse of the Iranian currency. What began with Tehran's bazaar merchants has, over the past two days, spread to additional cities. This trend is likely worrying senior officials, who for now are acting cautiously and have refrained from ordering the security forces to disperse the demonstrations by force. On the contrary, President Pezeshkian has instructed officials to understand the protesters' grievances and to engage in dialogue with them.
Behind the unrest lies Iran's growing economic distress, the product of a combination of factors. Chief among them are the stifling Western sanctions, especially on Iran's energy sector, alongside government corruption, the problematic involvement of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps in the economy, and chronic mismanagement. These are compounded by collapsing infrastructure and a series of natural disasters that have struck Iran over the past year.
The economic "perfect storm" hitting Iran is closely linked to Tehran's severe security predicament and its fear of another confrontation with Israel, a prospect that is forcing the regime to spend vast sums preparing for a future war. The regime's core problem is that it has little real capacity to address the economic challenges it faces. While President Pezeshkian has dismissed the governor of Iran's Central Bank, who was appointed during the tenure of former President Ebrahim Raisi, this move amounts to little more than a drop in the ocean. Even a new central bank governor cannot change the basic reality that the regime lacks the funds both to deal with the country's massive deficit and to avoid inflicting further economic and social harm on its citizens.
Naturally, every wave of protests revives hopes that this time it will bring about regime change in Iran. The difficulty is that, despite its distress, the regime has demonstrated resilience in the past when faced with similar, and even more severe, situations. It has relied on its internal security forces and exploited the absence of organized leadership capable of replacing it. The Iranian regime is well versed in a "divide and conquer" strategy that prevents the emergence of a critical mass in the streets. While it is true that the leadership has no hidden solution it can suddenly deploy to significantly improve Iran's situation beyond dismissing senior officials, as long as the regime maintains its security grip, it is doubtful that these protests alone will undermine its stability.
What would need to happen for it to be clear that this time is different? Protests would have to draw ever larger numbers into the streets, not only in Tehran but across the entire country, and not only merchants but all economic strata of Iranian society. They would need to persist over time and force the regime to choose between two options: making dramatic concessions to the protesters, or unleashing widespread and violent force in a way that could prompt significant numbers of Iranian security personnel to side with the demonstrators rather than confront them.
As for Israel and the West more broadly, despite the temptation to assist the protesters, it is essential to remember the regime's claim that all demonstrations are orchestrated by foreign actors. Any overt intervention is unlikely to help and is far more likely to harm the protesters themselves. Moreover, there is considerable doubt that the West can do anything to fundamentally alter Iran's internal dynamics. If change comes, it is likely to emerge from within, not through external assistance.
Bottom line: the protests in Iran should not surprise anyone, given the country's sputtering economy and the economic hardship that, as in the past, has driven people into the streets to protest the rising cost of living. At present, however, the regime appears to be in control, even if it is unsettled by the spread of demonstrations to different parts of the country. It is difficult to predict how events will unfold, particularly since the Iranian regime has previously managed situations like this, and even worse ones. Still, if the protests persist and expand to encompass all segments of Iranian society, the regime will be forced to make decisions about how to handle them that could shake its very foundations.
Yet even then, Iran lacks a genuine opposition. As a result, it is entirely possible that such a deterioration would not end in Iran's "liberation" but rather in its falling into the hands of even more conservative forces, not necessarily those who would bring about the long hoped-for change in Tehran.
