The prime minister is right that no one had given him an early warning or shown him signs about Hamas' intention to launch a war on October 7. But Hamas does not operate in a vacuum, and this attack did not emerge out of nowhere.
It is unclear what Tehran's endgame is. Among the scenarios are that Hamas and Israel continue to fight "until one of them is eliminated," and a protracted war in Gaza where each side continues to receive support, assistance, and backing from external actors.
“Every paradigm is good for its own time. A good strategist asks every day whether his strategy is still valid and Netanyahu didn’t do that," a former general says.
Some 150 targets have been hit and a Hamas battalion commander was eliminated. Ground operations expose the enemy and maximize the overall impact of the campaign. Additionally, they contribute to breaking the enemy's fighting spirit, which the IDF understands is necessary.
Achieving the goals that Israel has defined will take a long time. The elimination of Hamas' rule and the destruction of its military capabilities will not be achieved in a single defined and limited operation. They will be the results of a process that will involve many prolonged and continuous actions. It is important to formulate plans and manage expectations accordingly.
Hamas' policy of trickling hostages back to Israel is designed to delay Israel’s actions in the Strip. However, Israel has made it clear that the return of the captives will not limit ground operations.
In his policy address on Thursday pre-dawn (Israel time), President Biden sketched a new global map composed of a team of good guys – Israel, Ukraine, and the other democracies – on one side and a bad team – Russia, Iran, Hamas, and North Korea – on the other (surprisingly, China was left off the list).
It is probably safe to assume that the coordination between Qatar and Hamas, which led to the release of the two hostages, was intended to grant the terrorist organization several advantages: firstly, to delay and postpone as far as possible the IDF ground maneuver into the Gaza Strip.
After Operation Guardian of the Walls, two successive Shin Bet chiefs were of the view that Yahya Sinwar should be eliminated. Netanyahu, as well as the prime ministers who succeeded him between 2021-2022, preferred the calm after Operation Guardian of the Walls, and believed that Hamas was weak, deterred, and afraid of a confrontation.
Even though some statements by those in the War Cabinet are vague, it’s clear to everyone in the closed room that the day after the war, Hamas will not be in Gaza and may not be at all.
