Recently, a supposedly welcome trend has been on the rise in Israel in which former career army officials – major-generals and lieutenant-generals – are flocking to politics. But these generals, like their predecessors in politics, utterly avoid talking about any military matters, including preparedness, training, lessons learned, oversight and mentoring in the IDF, and that's just a partial list.
Instead, they have a ceaseless preoccupation with finding a solution to political issues. Their avoidance of all military issues, and their clear preference to focus almost exclusively on politics, causes one to suspect that their familiarity with the military, as a whole, is shallow.
Follow Israel Hayom on Facebook and Twitter
It's hard to ignore the fact that the IDF "retirees" who served as ministers or even as prime minister, failed to make any major contributions to Israel's defense and security, other than creating the impression that their very presence in the government is a guarantee that everything will be all right.
It's doubtful we would be able to find any positive contribution by the former IDF generals in the government of Golda Meir prior to the 1973 Yom Kippur War, from former chiefs of staff Haim Bar-Lev and Moshe Dayan to Maj. Gen. Yigal Allon, may their memories be blessed.
Similarly, there is no sweeping agreement that former Chief of Staff Yitzhak Rabin's military abilities contributed to his work as a statesman, from handling the rehabilitation of the IDF after the Yom Kippur War – whose mistakes were repeated in the First Lebanon War – to him and his senior defense officials ignoring the need to deter PLO founder Yasser Arafat from violating the Oslo Accords.
The same holds true for Lt. Gen. (ret.) Ehud Barak, who as prime minister and defense minister instructed the IDF to withdraw from Lebanon. According to the theory of war and basic management, care must be taken to ensure that a move like that is orderly and properly overseen.
In effect, the withdrawal was prepared lackadaisically, and rather than a well-ordered retreat, there was a panicked flight that ate away at whatever deterrence remained. Thus the withdrawal from Lebanon turned into the beginning of the Second Lebanon War of 2006.
In contrast to these people, the late Ariel Sharon (who held the rank of major-general) will be remembered well. After the terrorist slaughter at the Park Hotel in Netanya, Sharon took on the roles of defense minister and chief of staff. He initiated and directed the fighting in Operative Defensive Shield (2002) after the IDF was already on its back foot, the result of years of a policy of "containment" whose only purpose was to protect property and lives.
Sharon was the exception that proves the rule, so it's hard to understand how the Israeli public, the smartest and savviest in the world, is so quick to throw its support behind army officials who have no real achievements to their credit other than their career army service.
King Frederick the Great of Prussia mocked the senior officers who saw their participation in war campaigns as proof of their heroism by saying, "If I had to pin medals on the campaign veterans, the mules would be more deserving than anyone who was standing at the head of the line to receive them."
