To outside observers, the United States' conduct in its confrontation with Iran can appear aimless, erratic and even chaotic. President Donald Trump's mood when he wakes up in the morning and starts posting online seems to dictate what happens on the ground: One day, the United States appears headed for an all-out offensive that would wipe Iran off the map; the next, it is pursuing an agreement; and the day after that, it is settling for an economic blockade.
And yet there is a certain logic to the madness, namely Trump's logic. He is a shrewd businessman who has twice been elected president of the United States. Trump does not want war, and he makes no secret of it. He appears disappointed by what he regards as the limited achievements of the confrontation with Iran earlier this year and has no desire to "repeat the experiment."
The United States and Israel did, indeed, damage Iran's military and nuclear capabilities. But Tehran still has missiles, drones and other weapons, which it continues to use against the United States and its allies in the region. More importantly, the ayatollah regime remains alive and kicking, and Trump has little patience for the use of force when it fails to deliver immediate results. So rather than wage war, Trump prefers a diplomatic, or even economic, confrontation. Instead of attacking Iran, he is tightening the economic blockade, preventing Tehran from exporting oil and restricting its ability to import goods.
One factor working in Trump's favor is that the global economy has adapted to the new reality in the Gulf. The evidence, from his perspective, is that global oil prices, and especially prices at US gas stations, have not spiraled upward. More broadly, with the November midterm elections approaching, the war has receded from the headlines and is no longer dominating the attention of an American public that was hardly enthusiastic about it in the first place.
Another factor working in Trump's favor is the steadily deteriorating economic situation inside Iran. The Iranian rial is collapsing against the dollar, shortages of food products are being felt in the markets and prices are soaring. It is clear that the regime in Tehran will find it difficult to sustain a country of some 90 million people under such conditions indefinitely. The only problem is that "indefinitely" can mean different things: It could mean a matter of months, but it could also mean several years.
That is the basis of Trump's strategy. Because the Iranians fear an all-out war, and because they cannot withstand his economic blockade forever, his assumption is that they will blink first and capitulate.
But Trump is failing to take into account that, from Iran's perspective, there may be little left to lose. Surrendering or making concessions, or alternatively dragging things out until the economy collapses, may seem worse to Tehran than major escalation and a resumption of the fighting.
After all, the Iranians do not see themselves as having been defeated in the war. From their perspective, it was Trump who blinked first, halted the fighting and was eager to reach an agreement with them. Moreover, they still possess significant military capabilities that they can use to ignite a major conflagration in the Gulf.
Trump and Israel therefore need to consider the possibility that, however reluctant the Iranians may be to go to war, Tehran could ultimately conclude that war is the lesser evil. It may even decide that it is better to break out into an all-out confrontation than to sit back and wait for its economy to collapse.
The Iranians may also assume that Trump fears war more than they do. As a result, they may believe that even if they open fire, Trump will not dare return to high-intensity fighting and will do everything possible to restore calm.
Trump would therefore be well advised to convince the Iranians that he is serious and that, if necessary, he is prepared to unleash the full force of the United States against them. As things stand, that message is not being conveyed.
The working assumption in Israel and Washington is that the situation remains under control, and that the United States and Iran are engaged in a coercive but managed dialogue, with little danger of renewed full-scale fighting. But policymakers must take into account the possibility that Iran will decide to overturn the table if it concludes that its economy has been pushed to the wall, or that Trump will buckle under pressure and back down if Iran is the one that resumes the fighting.
Prophecy is given to fools, all the more so when the question is what Trump will do and what the Iranians will do. Even so, under circumstances like these, caution is essential.
