Iran wants to deal a painful blow to Israel. A spokesman for Iran's Foreign Ministry said Iran plans to retaliate for the reported Israeli attack on the T4 air base in Syria's Homs province, in which seven of its elite Quds Force members were killed, including the commander of its drone unit in Syria.
Iran understands that Israel is determined to prevent its takeover of Syria, but it sees maintaining its military presence in Syria as being of the utmost strategic significance, and it intends to defend it.
However, Iran's ability to contend with Israel on the Syrian front is limited. Its air force has no combat experience and its planes are obsolete. While Russia delivered its advanced S-300 aerial defense system to Iran in 2015, the anti-aircraft missile batteries are stationed in Iran, to defend that country's important sites, foremost among them its nuclear facilities.
Iran has no interest in an all-out confrontation with Israel, which would also threaten its military outpost in Syria. And in an all-out confrontation, Israel would have an additional advantage, in that the fighting would be waged hundreds of kilometers from the borders of Iran. Israel could disrupt the transfer of military forces and weapons to Syria. Iran would also need to take into account that Israel would use the opportunity presented by such a conflict to attack its nuclear facilities.
Israel would have to take into account Iran's and Hezbollah's large stockpiles of missiles and rockets, which can reach every part of Israel and constitute the core of the Iranian threat to Israel.
But the significance of the massive use of those weapons would be an all-out confrontation with Israel, a development Iran does not want.
Iran could consider a number of other options: It could avoid responding to the attack, as it has largely done until now. This is not likely, though, because Iran sees itself as obligated to act to prevent Israeli attacks. It could instead try to surprise Israel when the opportunity arises, for instance at a time when the situation in the Gaza Strip is rapidly deteriorating.
Iran could also choose to respond in a limited fashion that would make it clear to Israel that continued attacks will be met with a stronger response. This could involve Iran launching a few rockets or an attack drone toward Israel, or possibly perpetrating a terrorist attack on Israel's border with Syria or elsewhere in the world.
If this is the option Iran selects, it is likely to prefer using its Shiite proxies, particularly Hezbollah, to do the legwork. While Iran has superior operational capabilities, and though some Hezbollah members have grumbled about being used as Iran's cannon fodder, Hezbollah is skilled enough to launch an adequate offensive, providing Iran with greater flexibility.
At any rate, Iran is unlikely to bombard Israel with rocket fire because neither Tehran nor Hezbollah are interested in an all-out confrontation with Israel.
There are, however, two other options. Iran could ask Russia to restrict Israel's actions in Syria through the use of diplomatic pressure. Russia has already taken a step in this direction following the attack on the T4 air base. There is also talk of Russia deploying S-300 systems to Syria, which would undermine Israel's freedom of action in the country.
Iran could also attempt a cyberattack on Israel. But since Israel is considered a global cyber power, Iran would likely be made to pay a price for such a move.
The bottom line is that Iran does not have any good options when it comes to contending with Israel in the Syrian arena. All of its options carry significant risks.
Nevertheless, the sense of obligation to respond to the attack could lead the regime to act. Even the limited measures it would seemingly prefer to take against Israel are liable to result in all-out conflict that would undermine its achievements in the region.
