What has made Jenin of all places the central habitat for the terrorism now striking the State of Israel? Between 2013 and 2015, I was in charge of the city as the commander of the Israel Defense Force's Menashe Brigade. One of the central challenges in that role was controlling the Jenin refugee camp.
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The IDF acted nearly every day inside the refugee camp to arrest terrorists or demonstrate a routine military presence. This action was also maintained when my successors entered the role. The IDF continued to openly operate there, albeit to a lesser extent.
Around a month and a half ago, I spoke in a civilian capacity with a senior official in the IDF's Central Command and asked about the situation in the Northern Samaria in general and the Jenin refugee camp in particular. I was told the IDF has not had an overt presence in the camp since August 2021 due to constraints preventing them from operating freely there. I was stunned, but it turned out the senior official had not revealed any military secrets.
The constraints he had spoken of were diplomatic echelon restraints. As has been reported by the media, the Palestinian Authority asked the government to avoid overt operations in Area A, and the State of Israel accepted the request.
The result of the move is fairly clear. Over the last month, numerous terrorists have left the camp and the surrounding villages, and Israel has paid a heavy price after years of relative quiet. It is only now that they are allowing the IDF to act and put the genie back in the bottle.
There is a professional approach that argues that it is best to avoid conflict with an unfriendly population when possible and to only enter Area A with special forces and in response to terror alerts.
Another professional approach holds that we must maintain constant contact with the enemy because only constant friction creates relevant intelligence. In other words, better to mess with your enemy than to let them mess with you. Personally, I tend to prefer the latter approach, but I certainly understand the operational logic of the former approach.
But I would argue that the decision not to act openly for a prolonged length of time in the refugee camp stemmed from an agenda disguised as a professional approach. That same agenda continues to make repeated attempts to rely on Palestinian security mechanisms to do the work for us. Ultimately, the Palestinian security mechanisms turn out to lack the professional ability to carry out the mission in full and will always act only in accordance with what suits their own interests.
Worse still, the perpetrator of the last terrorist attack in Tel Aviv was the son of a senior Palestinian security official who praised his son's act. In practice, we have seen terrorist attack upon terrorist attack ever since the decision was made to limit overt IDF activity in Area A.
To this, we must of course add the issue of the security fence. Unfortunately, during a tour of the place three weeks ago, I discovered that the separation fence is broken, allowing terrorists to easily enter our territory and harm our citizens. But in the absence of any proactive, offensive activity through maintaining continuous contact on the ground, the construction of a barrier wall will not rein in terror.
In conclusion, I am certainly in favor of maximal coordination with PA security forces, and as a brigadier general, I was assisted by them and they were assisted by us a great deal. But this joint, coordinated activity must suit our security interests. Cutting off contact with the refugee camp in Jenin for a significant period of time has harmed security. This is also true of every other city and village in Judea and Samaria. Ties with the PA are a means to maintain the State of Israel's security and not the end. Israeli security must not be harmed in an effort to maintain them.
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