The summer of 1962 was rife with dramatic events in the American-Israeli diplomatic sphere. The most important of these events was the window of opportunity that opened to Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, who used it to persuade US President John F. Kennedy to sell Israel, for the first time, advanced medium-range surface-to-air Hawk missiles.
To seal this deal (which was finalized in August 1962), Ben-Gurion was willing to pay a considerable price. Specifically, the prime minister was ready to deviate from the basic norms of Israel's fledgling democracy and order the immediate extradition of spy Dr. Robert Soblen, who was convicted in the US for transferring classified information to the Soviet Union. Soblen was not allowed to exhaust his legal right in Israel to appeal the decision to extradite him. Soblen had been sentenced in the US to seven years in prison but was released on bail until June 28, the date he was set to report to prison. And yet, on the day he was supposed to report to prison, he fled the US under a false identity and landed in Israel, where he requested asylum under the Law of Return.
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Despite the fact that Israel and the US still hadn't ratified their extradition agreement, and despite Soblen's affliction with cancer, he was expelled under the cover of darkness, three days after landing in Israel. Ben-Gurion's strong desire to avoid a crisis with the American administration was the deciding factor. The affair came to a grim end. After Solben tried killing himself during the flight he was hospitalized in London, and finally committed suicide on September 11 on his way from there to US prison.
Notwithstanding the benefits of the special relationship between the US and Israel that emerged over the decades, the Solben affair illustrates the weight of decisions pertaining to Israel's vital diplomatic and security interests, within the context of its relations with the US. Some 57 years ago, Ben-Gurion eschewed an entire array of possible considerations on the altar of US-Israel relations, in the ultimate goal of making Washington the main supplier of sophisticated weapons to Israel. Now too, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu took into account (even if not fully) those same considerations so inherently tied to Israel's national security. Thus, after an about-face, he decided to bar pro-BDS US Congresswomen Rashida Tlaib and Ilhan Omar from entering Israel.
Indeed, similar to Ben-Gurion's relationship with Kennedy, Netanyahu, too, could not have afforded a public feud – and perhaps even crisis – with the White House, following US President Donald Trump's adamant stance on the matter. Yet despite the desire to mitigate potential friction with the Oval Office, there is a fundamental difference between the saga in 1962 and the current storm. While Ben-Gurion didn't hesitate at all, Israel's consideration of the White House's wishes wasn't absolute this time around.
After all, in contrast to Omar, Netanyahu decided to allow Tlaib special permission (via Interior Minister Aryeh Deri) to enter Israel to visit her elderly grandmother, against Trump's position. This permission, of course, was granted on condition that her visit wouldn't be used as a pretext for delegitimizing Israel. After Tlaib rescinded her promise to refrain from such activity, her original intention to cause provocations was exposed.
