Facing reality this time was quicker and more painful than expected. The fighting in Gaza has subsided, but the war has not ended, and we remain far from the promised peace, farther than east is from west.
At the Knesset session held in honor of US President Donald Trump, a gathering marked by flattery, obsequiousness, and a loss of national self-respectm, Trump promised us a historic peace agreement with the Arab and Muslim world. In practice, however, Israel finds itself facing a Hamas organization that enjoys American protection and is rebuilding its strength in the Gaza Strip under that very umbrella.
From the outset, there was an unbridgeable gulf between Phase A of the deal, ending the fighting and returning our hostages and fallen soldiers, and the lofty vision of peace on earth between Israel and the Arab and Islamic states, which, under the terms of the agreement, includes the establishment of a Palestinian state.
Yet it turns out that even within the framework of Phase Am, the easier part of the agreement, Hamas has failed to meet its commitments. Instead, it is playing its usual game, testing Israel's limits and, even more so, those of the United States. Washington, for its part, is buying the false promises Hamas is selling and remains convinced, as President Trump repeatedly assures us after being "educated" by his friends in Turkey and Qatar, that "Hamas will behave properly."
The real problem lies in Phase B of the agreement, whose implementation depends on three "miracles": first, the disarmament of Hamas; second, the establishment of a non-Hamas Palestinian government to administer Gaza; and third, the deployment of an international force to maintain order in the Strip.
But who exactly is supposed to disarm Hamas? The Lebanese precedent teaches us that, contrary to the hopes and illusions underpinning the flimsy ceasefire agreement signed in November 2024, Hezbollah, the Lebanese Shiite terrorist organization, has shown no willingness to even consider disarmament. Lebanon's government and army are neither willing nor able to compel it to do so.
Hezbollah, therefore, remains standing strong and is rebuilding its power, while Israel contents itself with limited "campaigns between wars" that barely scratch Hezbollah's capabilities or its determination to stage a political and military comeback in Lebanon and against Israel.
And in Gaza, just like in Lebanon, Hamas has already declared that it will not disarm. Many speak on its behalf, promising that the organization may consider it someday, but both its leadership and its actions on the ground show otherwise. After all, Hamas did not fight for two years, paying a heavy price in destruction and lives, only to simply surrender and vanish.
Hamas is signaling that it is in Gaza to stay, this time under the cover of an agreement and, effectively, under American protection. Washington has repeatedly intervened to restrain and limit Israel's actions, and it will continue to do so in the future.
The challenge facing Israel is clear and is one it has avoided confronting for more than two years: What should be done about Gaza? And what should be done about Hamas, which is gradually restoring its capabilities, not to the level of a pre-October 7 military threat, but certainly as a governing and military force capable of controlling Gaza? All this while Israel, due to American opposition, cannot and will not reoccupy the Strip.
Israel has therefore failed in its effort to defeat Hamas and is unprepared to deal with it diplomatically. It is now evident that Phase B of the agreement will not materialize, that Hamas will refuse to disarm, and that no international force will enter Gaza to confront it, except perhaps forces from Turkey or Qatar, which would gladly come to assist Hamas.
Israel must therefore prepare for a reality of a living, breathing, and kicking Hamas—albeit weakened and battered—continuing to operate freely in the Gaza Strip under the very deal it signed.
