On December 13, 1949, Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion declared Jerusalem the capital of Israel and ordered the transfer of state institutions there from Tel Aviv. In the UN Partition Plan of November 1947, Jerusalem was not included in the Jewish state's territory. During and after the 1948 War of Independence, proposals were even raised internationally to place the city under international rule, or to hand it over to Jordan. Israel effectively set its capital in Tel Aviv, where the president, government, Knesset and other state institutions sat.
Ben-Gurion's announcement came, naturally, as the UN General Assembly was meeting in New York to debate the Middle East. At the time, Israel was waging a tough diplomatic battle to preserve the gains of the War of Independence, against most of the world, which demanded territorial concessions and the return of Palestinian refugees as the only path to peace.
But Ben-Gurion did not back down and decided to move the capital to Jerusalem. As expected, the world erupted in protest, condemned Israel harshly, and threatened retaliatory steps. Leading the opposition, as usual, were European countries, joined by the United States, whose ties with Israel in those years were cool and even hostile. But the die was cast, and Jerusalem became the capital. Inside Israel, too, many opposed the move. Foreign Minister Moshe Sharett even submitted his resignation to Ben-Gurion, perhaps as protest, having warned that the step would bring disaster, or perhaps, as he later claimed, because he had not foreseen the diplomatic tsunami that swept over Israel.
Today we are once again warned that Israel is on the verge of diplomatic isolation, highlighted by the recognition of a Palestinian state by Britain, France and other Western countries. But such warnings should be taken with a grain of salt. First, most of the world, 147 of the UN's 193 member states, has already recognized a Palestinian state for years, yet it has not come into being nor is it likely to in the near future. Second, a Palestinian state has not emerged not only because Israel controls the territory, but also because of the Palestinian Authority's ongoing failure to maintain functioning institutions and, above all, because of the looming threat of Hamas, which could seize control of any area handed over to the Palestinians.
In 1955, as Israel battled waves of terrorist attacks while being urged to exercise restraint out of fear of international criticism, Ben-Gurion declared: Only the courage of the Jews established the state, not some 'UN-shmun' decision… Our future depends not on what the nations say, but on what the Jews do. Still, Ben-Gurion was mindful of limits and the need for alliances. He launched the 1956 Sinai Campaign only after securing French backing, which for a time provided Israel with political cover and military aid.
The historical lesson is clear. A country like Israel, facing existential security challenges in a complex and hostile regional and global arena, cannot base its actions solely on how the world will respond.
The decision by some European states and others to recognize a Palestinian state stems from political calculations, appeasing the radical left and Muslim immigrant communities. It carries no real weight or meaning and will ultimately fade into history. Yet Israel must know what it seeks and can achieve, what is worth fighting for, and where to show flexibility. With all due respect to Gaza, it is not Jerusalem. As Menachem Begin once put it: Learn from Masada how not to reach it, and from Modiin how to build it.
The real question we must keep in sight is how to preserve cohesion and unity within Israeli society, and around what shared principles and goals to forge broad national consensus.
