The rockets fired at the Golan Heights on Saturday night seem like a signal to Israel that it alone doesn't determine the rules of the game in the northern arena.
It was not the first attack of that type. Rockets have already been fired at the Hermon in recent years.
As a reminder, the most recent rocket attack, in January, took place in the afternoon hours and was carried out by Shiite militias supported by Iran, while the ski resort in the area was full of visitors. The rocket was intercepted by an Iron Dome battery stationed there in advance. That incident, which came in response to an Israeli airstrike, was exploited by Israel to carry out a broad attack on Iranian targets in Syria, most notably a logistics center used by the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and Hezbollah at the international airport in Damascus, which was knocked almost completely out of commission.
And yet, the rocket attack on Saturday was unusual in the sense that it seemingly came out of the blue. Unlike previous incidents, the attack wasn't carried out in response or retaliation to any Israeli activity.
This could indicate that someone on the other side is fed up with Israel dictating the rules of the game in the north, and wants to send it a message that there's more than one player on the field.
As of Sunday evening, Israeli officials were still unsure who fired the Grad rockets, one of which landed on the Hermon and the other, apparently, in Syrian territory.
The rockets were launched from a distance of around 30 kilometers (19 miles), from an area with multiple active actors, at least three of whom could have an interest in harming Israel: the Syrian regime or a group acting on its behalf, in an attempt to convey Damascus' sovereignty; Iranian proxies (Shiite militias or Hezbollah), seeking revenge against Israel for a plethora of possible reasons – from airstrikes on weapons depots to economic sanctions imposed on Tehran; or another player, either Palestinian or another such terrorist group, who managed to get their hands on rockets and decided to put them to use.
From Israel's perspective, it doesn't really matter who fired the rockets. The response – striking Syrian artillery and anti-aircraft batteries and an intelligence gathering post near the border – sought to reiterate that as the sovereign power it is the regime's responsibility to prevent hostile activities against Israel from its territory. This is Israel's standing policy (in Gaza, too) – target the sovereign entity so that it exerts said sovereignty – to which it adhered to even throughout the Syrian civil war when the Assad regime was not in control of the border region. Therefore, it stands to reason that Israel is continuing to implement this policy now that the Syrian army has seized full control of the frontier region.
Still, this rocket attack should concern officials in Jerusalem because it means that someone in Syria wants to challenge Israel.
For the time being, the attack does not alter the basic situational assessment. The IDF enjoys complete dominance in the northern sector. If it avoids making mistakes (specifically regarding Russian forces in Syria), it will be able to continue, for now, to pound away at Iran's entrenchment and weapons smuggling efforts. In the long term, however, Israel will have to consider and plan new avenues of action that reinforce deterrence and ensure that Israel meets its objectives in Syria; and as a byproduct in Lebanon as well.
Given the recent political upheaval in Israel, this task falls almost squarely on the IDF's shoulders.
Consequently, IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Aviv Kochavi will have to continue bearing an extraordinarily heavy load until a new, stable government can formulate a clear policy, security-related and otherwise. Until then, it seems things will mostly stay the same: from the frequent headaches in Gaza to the far more disconcerting security concerns in the north.
