Israel entered the latest Gaza campaign almost without a choice – having come under intense rocket fire from the Palestinian Islamic Jihad and following a period of perceived erosion in deterrence. The assassination of the senior PIJ leaders in the first hours of the operation achieved its overarching objective.
Follow Israel Hayom on Facebook, Twitter, and Instagram
The combination of Israelis' stamina and the Iron Dome managed to frustrate the PIJ's efforts to change the balance of power in its favor. However, Operation Arrow and Shield was not designed to fundamentally change the situation in Gaza but only to bring about another period of relative calm.
To truly transform the situation, Israel would have to carry out a major and protracted operation deep inside Gaza. The cost might not be worth it. The alternative to such a campaign is the repeated cycles Israel and the Palestinians engage in. The drawbacks are clear and plenty, but if we want to make the most of those rounds of hostilities we have to use the relative periods of calm they provide to engage in a methodic, low-profile campaign to stop the terrorists from getting more powerful.
When the ceasefire is declared for the umpteenth time, the senior leadership of Hamas and PIJ always emerge from their hideouts, having been spared from the "martyrs list" of the previous rounds. They tour the ruins and take pictures with the flag of their organizations, waxing lyrical on how they managed to withstand the force of the Zionist enemy and how "our fighters dealt a crushing blow that generated fear all over."
As they engage in the war on the hearts and minds, their military commanders will try to learn the lessons from the past round and find replacements to fill in the ranks of the organization and to build more strength for the next outbreak of hostilities. Meanwhile, without having to wait for orders, operations will resume in one of the areas that are key to the success of terrorist organizations: the weapon manufacturing disposition.
The efforts to manufacture weapons will increase and the pace will accelerate in order to replenish the stockpiles and prepare for the next round. The goal: more rocket fire that will reach farther and be more lethal and precise. Most of the weapons and munitions used against Israel are indigenously made in Gaza using material and means that get imported – either via Israel or from Egypt. In some cases, these are dual-use imports that could be used for both civilian and military purposes. Israel allows their transfer to Gaza for legitimate usage but then they are seized by terrorist organizations and end up in the local arms manufacturing workshops.
Israel's policy on Gaza has to strike a balance between the two competing interests. On the hand, Israel wants to improve Gazans' well-being and address their humanitarian concerns, in part because this would make it clear that they would have a lot to lose if they engage in conflict. That is why it allows such material to enter. On the other hand, it wants to make it harder for terrorists to get powerful and that is why it seeks to prevent material that boosts their capabilities.
But the decision-making process in this regard is complex and could lead to Israel preferring the immediate calm over the long-term calculus that seeks to deny terrorists weapons. This could be because of the many challenges this balancing act presents: First, fighting the terrorists often appears to be an effort that is carried out in vain because they already have so many arms. Second, it is hard to truly monitor what manages to enter the area. Third, because of the boiling frog syndrome: You don't feel an urgency when things go up by one notch at a time in moderation. The fourth is that sometimes there is a clear tendency to fall in love with the relative calm, which dovetails with the desire to minimize the amount of energy you use on various fronts.
Precisely because of this, the ceasefire should come with stringent conditions as well as a mechanism to monitor the terrorists' buildup and to stop it. We must set a clear goal for our security forces that they must stop the buildup as well as disrupt it, making it a major objective for the "campaign between the wars." They must be told to present a comprehensive plan that would have clear and methodic measures of success.
Israel must also impose stricter conditions on issuing permits for the import into Gaza of dual-usage raw materials and other substances and demand that Egypt adopts a similar policy on its border with Gaza. Israel must also devise a comprehensive plan to target the terrorist arms manufacturing infrastructure. It must be designed in a way that meets the economic needs of Gaza and is commensurate with the overall arrangements Israel agreed to, and it must have clear benchmarks and take advantage of opportunities that come up to strike the relevant assets.
Calm is essential if we want to focus on other challenges and lead a healthy and normal life, as well as grow and thrive. The organizations in Gaza need it in order to improve their capabilities for the next conflict. The more we use those lulls to prevent their amassing of strength in Gaza, the longer those lulls will be and the less intense the hostilities are when they break.
Meir Ben Shabbat is head of the Misgav Institute for National Security & Zionist Strategy, in Jerusalem. He served as Israel's national security advisor and head of the National Security Council between 2017 and 2021, and prior to that for 30 years in the General Security Service (the Shin Be security agency or "Shabak").
Subscribe to Israel Hayom's daily newsletter and never miss our top stories!
