For ten months, the Galilee has been deserted. For ten months, the IDF and Hezbollah have been playing ping-pong with each other.
Hezbollah fires an anti-tank missile - ping.
Israel eliminates the squad that fired it - pong.
Hezbollah launches a drone towards a base - ping.
Israel takes out Hezbollah's drone expert - pong.
And while Israel plays ping-pong, the north remains empty of civilians, and there is no prospect of them returning home - being refugees in their own country. From this perspective, the attack on Majdal Shams is not a "disaster" but a failure. It is a direct result of a policy that "tolerates" Hezbollah's attacks instead of ending them.
This approach has deep roots and did not begin in October 2023. After the Second Lebanon War, Israel unofficially adopted the recommendations of the Meridor Committee to update its security concept. From now on, Israel's security would rest on four pillars - not just deterrence, warning, and decisive victory, but also defense. The reason is clear: during the Lebanon War, Hezbollah fired thousands of rockets into northern Israel, making the defense of the home front urgent, and decision-makers wanted to address this need. Thus, an issue that had always existed in Israel's wars became an important component of its security strategy.
The Meridor Committee believed that defense would improve the political leadership's maneuverability and strengthen deterrence. If the home front is protected, Israel can afford to undertake longer and more complex operations, benefiting from the breathing room that defense provides.
In practice, the opposite happened - defense made the IDF and Israel much more passive. Resources were diverted from building offensive capabilities to establishing defense systems, such as the Iron Dome, Arrow system, and the "smart" border fence with Gaza. However, because the damage that the enemy could cause was reduced, the incentive to launch a decisive military operation to eradicate it also decreased. If the rockets from Gaza or Lebanon are just a "drizzle," why risk soldiers in clearing and taking enemy territory? Better target the enemy's ability to shoot, and better to do so from afar. Ground maneuvering was replaced by stand-off fire, mainly by use of airstrikes. The Air Force shifted from a force that ensures the conditions for a ground victory to the main combat force, with ground forces becoming a complementary component.
This approach can be evidenced in a 2019 speech by Brigadier General Roman Gofman, then commander of the 7th Armored Brigade, when he addressed then-Chief of Staff Gadi Eisenkot: "Commander, I want to tell you that we (the ground forces) are ready and willing to fight. There is only one problem - you are not deploying us."
Hezbollah in Lebanon, even more so than Hamas, is probably the best example of the absolute failure of this strategic shift. There was never any doubt that Hezbollah was growing stronger and becoming a serious threat to Israel. Hamas was underestimated, and thus the conquest of Gaza was avoided until the October 7 massacre. What is the excuse for Hezbollah? After all, if it was clear that this was a growing threat, why was nothing done?
Instead of initiating a strategic change, Israel relied on defense and airstrikes to create deterrence and, if possible, slow down the enemy's growth. Israel has become a state that accepts threats against it. The shooting at the Galilee did not begin in October 2023. Not many remember, but these attacks returned as early as June 2007, a year after the end of the Second Lebanon War. Over time, the parties learned to tolerate each other - Hezbollah "released pressure," we said, through Palestinian organizations in Lebanon, and the IDF remained silent, focusing on striking weapon convoys in Syria.
The ping-pong in the north has lasted for over a decade, almost two. Does the Israeli government have the resolve necessary to stop it?
