Operation Arrows of the North should have been launched months ago, as Defense Minister Yoav Gallant and top security officials recommended. It's regrettable that Israel's government only remembered to define a war objective (albeit a vague one) for the northern front just last week. Now, we must establish a clear exit strategy and avoid being dragged into an unending war.
The events of the past week on the Lebanese front highlight the unique contrast in our strategic situation. On the one hand, we've seen an impressive series of intelligence and operational missions on a global scale – bordering on dangerous euphoria. On the other hand, there's a cluster of questions about policy failures in managing the campaign since October 7, 2023.
It's no secret that the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) prepared combat plans for Lebanon many months ago and even presented them to decision-makers. It's reasonable to assume that what was executed in the past week is very close to these plans, with real-time intelligence updates added. Even the psychological warfare, the takeover of radio stations, and the successful mobilization of the population northward are not inventions of recent days. The IDF was like a coiled spring that had been waiting a long time for the green light.
Assuming Israel is behind the beeper and communication devices operation, these capabilities have been available to campaign managers for a long time. Absolute intelligence superiority and amazing operational strike capabilities are a dream for any decision-maker.
This week, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu said: "We don't wait for threats, we preempt them in every place, in every arena, at all times." There is no greater distortion of reality than this. We've been in this war for a whole year, and only this week did the powerful offensive operation go out. The subtext behind the prime minister's statement should have brought us to an initiated operation many months ago, perhaps even on October 11 – as the defense minister and top security officials recommended. So contrary to his words, until last week, we did wait for the threat – we didn't preempt it. We abandoned the residents of the north and restrained the IDF.
In 2006, Operation Destiny began with the bombing of dozens of civilian homes in Lebanon, where missiles were prepared for launch. Does this remind anyone of the current intelligence on similar targets? If so, why hasn't there been an initiative until now?
So, what are the challenges and opportunities from here on out? So far, despite the unprecedented humiliation and hits, Hezbollah has still not brought its array of precise long-range missiles into its fighting and has not attacked our large population centers. There are several reasons for this: severe damage to its operational control system, confusion and lack of confidence in leadership, grave concern that Lebanon will look like the Gaza Strip, and finally, there's Iran – it's the one that built Hezbollah's strategic array, not to "waste it" on helping Hamas, but to help itself on a day of distress. Therefore, the question of questions in this context is whether and when Iran will release it or whether it will "cut losses" to preserve it for itself.
On the Israeli side, we must define an exit strategy and not be dragged into (or initiate) a long war that doesn't end. Returning to the status quo of the past year is unacceptable. Equally, defining a decisive victory and/or total victory is unreasonable. On one hand, we have an interest in disconnecting the Hezbollah-Hamas axis. On the other hand, Israel must connect the strategy of all arenas into a "war of attrition-breaking."
In the Gaza Strip, the military move has exhausted itself and justified a smart exit strategy several months ago. The hostage deal is critical to national security, and it's time to stop talking about a deal in stages, which promises at best the return of a small part of them, and move to a comprehensive deal in one pulse – now!
