From the first moment, "Trump's proposal" for an agreement to bring all Israeli hostages home in one day – before a declaration of the war's end or a significant Israeli withdrawal – seemed far-fetched.
If it turns out it was simply a deception exercise intended to gather senior Hamas leaders in Doha for a meeting (in this case, a last meeting), this would not be the first time: a similar deception exercise, involving the American president and Israeli media, was conducted before the surprise attack on Iran. There too, it succeeded.
The decision to target Qatar represents a milestone in Israel–US relations, or perhaps Netanyahu–Trump relations, but it also reflects another essential element in the prime minister's war management: over his many years leading the country, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu acted moderately and cautiously regarding military force, avoiding breaking enemy balances. Since October 7 that approach has changed. It appears that now no operational plan reaches Netanyahu without his at least serious consideration.
What began as a deep and genuine trust crisis between Netanyahu and the security establishment reversed completely during the long months of war, at least in special operations (the effort to defeat Hamas in Gaza is a different matter).
The strike on Qatari soil likewise expresses Israeli and American frustration with the Gulf state, which mediates in negotiations on one hand but hosts Hamas' foreign leadership with royal honor on the other.
This frustration is also directed at Hamas's foreign leadership, which imposed difficulties on negotiation progress and steadfastly refuses to compromise. Israel has taken responsibility: it struck Hamas leadership in Qatar.
Israel previously eliminated people it negotiated with (Yahyah Sinwar, Ismail Haniyeh), and the sky did not fall. Hamas leaders in Gaza are now more isolated and pressured than ever before, and no one knows for sure how they will respond. Will they execute hostages? Surrender? Or attempt to squeeze Israel to the utmost, this time relying exclusively on Egypt to mediate?
It must be assumed that the Shin Bet – responsible for the intelligence in the operation and whose command center in central Israel ran the operation – seriously considered these questions.
The dynamics in this war are unlike anything else in history, and trying to predict would be pointless. History will judge whether the Qatar operation advances Israel's war goals.
One thing is certain looking back over the past 23 months: When Israel dares, surprises, and strikes with strength – it usually paid off.
