The seventh round of nuclear negotiations between Iran and world powers, which began anew in Vienna several days ago, hit significant snags from the get-go due to Iran's inflexible, intransigent position. The impression was that Western diplomats didn't understand that the game and actors had changed over the prolonged period between rounds due to the changing of the Iranian regime.
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Unlike past Iranian delegations headed by former foreign minister Mohammad Javad Zarif, no one on Iran's new 40-person delegation, dispatched to Vienna by hardline President Ebrahim Raisi, bothered dispensing artificial smiles to reporters or even tried speaking in other languages. All of them, it seems, were inspired by their leader, Deputy Foreign Minister and chief nuclear negotiator Ali Bagheri Kani, one of the more outspoken critics of the original nuclear deal, who only speaks Farsi.
The writing on the wall was evident in the very first meeting. The Europeans read an American announcement drafted by the Biden administration's special Iran envoy Robert Malley, who was staying with his delegation at an adjacent hotel. The Iranians, as if snake-bitten, immediately jumped from their seats in protest. "The Americans are not a side in these discussions," they shouted. "Don't they dare threaten us." The European representative apologized. "We were wrong. It won't happen again."
Iran's aggressive approach was merely an introduction to its "three Nos" policy: No to an intermediate deal (less for less), meaning the partial cessation of nuclear activities in exchange for the removal of some sanctions; no to a broader deal consisting of restrictions on Iran's ballistic missile program and subversive activities in the region; and no to a deal that doesn't ensure the removal of all sanctions imposed on the Islamic republic, including sanctions that don't pertain to the nuclear deal.
They completely ignored past understandings that are no longer convenient for them, which had been reached during the previous six rounds of talks. They insisted that their relations will all countries in the region were sound, and presented as evidence the visit of the UAE's top national security adviser to Iran on Monday ("hence there's no need for sanctions"). They tried driving a wedge between the Americans and Europeans ("If you hold firm to your position, the Americans will be persuaded"), and they tried drumming up friction between the US and Israel ("Israeli actions, overt and covert, are only meant to sabotage the negotiations").
Unfortunately, the Americans are starting to buy this argument. Leaks have recently appeared in the US here and there, whereby Israel's clandestine efforts to disrupt the Iranian dash to a bomb are only amplifying Iran's efforts to accelerate its progress (as if Tehran needed negative "incentives" to rush ahead).
All of this makes the job of Mossad chief David Barnea and Defense Minister Benny Gantz, who will visit Washington this week, more difficult and complex. They will need to make it clear to the administration that Israel has no intention of ceasing its efforts to prevent Iran from acquiring a nuclear weapon, in any way possible. Furthermore, they will need to explain to the Biden administration – which is presently preoccupied by threats of a Russian invasion of Ukraine, and a Chinese invasion of Taiwan, and badly wants a swift resolution to the Iranian issue – that Tehran is well aware of the situation and is trying to exploit it.
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In other words, the Biden administration's flimsy threats to consider a military option aren't swaying Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, who believes the American president won't order a military strike. On the other hand, a clear American message whereby if the Iranians don't stop their race toward a bomb the US will give Israel a green light to act, alongside moving heavy bombers and bunker-busting munitions to Israel, which haven't been provided thus far – could be effective and prove a far greater deterrent.
