On my way back to the hotel from the embassy district in Delhi this week, my phone was buzzing with alerts. This time they were not the Color Red rocket alerts I had gotten used to in the last two months, but alerts about an attack here, in India, the land of shanti and yoga.
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The explosion occurred while dozens of Israelis were present at the embassy compound. Next to the explosive device was found a revenge letter addressed to the Israeli ambassador to India, Naor Gilon. The event ended without casualties, but the National Security Council has already issued a travel warning for Israelis in the area.
Assessments point to Iran being behind the attempted attack. This is not the first time Tehran uses India as the place where it implements its doctrine. In February 2012, the wife of an official from the Israeli Ministry of Defense was moderately injured in an explosion of an explosive device attached to her car near the mission in Delhi.
On January 29, 2021, an explosive device was set off near the embassy (there were no casualties). The Indian counter-terrorism agencies blamed Iran's Quds Force. Then too, the perpetrators left a revenge letter declaring their intention to avenge the deaths of senior Iranians. The timing of the attack was not coincidental: It was the 29th anniversary of the establishment of diplomatic relations between India and Israel.
Iran's modus operandi in attacks of this kind is identical: An improvised explosive device set off by remote control by terrorists from a local Shiite unit. This is because Iran wants to maintain plausible deniability and avoid the diplomatic repercussions for its actions on the soil of a country with which it has friendly relations. At the same time, due to these conditions, Iranian involvement is limited, reducing the quality of the attacks to a level that is less spectacular than what Iran would like.
India is home to the world's third largest Shiite population, after Iran and Pakistan; students on Indian campuses provide fertile ground for recruiting would-be assailants for such operations. Another pool of candidates lies in students from central and south Asia who study in Iranian academic institutions. According to data from the Indian Foreign Ministry, about 2,000 Indian students reside in Iran.
The choice of Delhi was not random. A narrative has been built against India as the "betrayer who goes with the West," because it is perceived as one of the prime beneficiaries of normalization between Israel and Saudi Arabia through the opening of the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor.
Despite the friendly ties between Delhi and Tehran, relations have been in crisis mode for the past five years: India has had to reduce its oil imports from the Islamic Republic after the US did not extend the special sanction waiver, forcing Delhi to increase its oil purchases from the US, Saudi Arabia, and Iraq.
Since the outbreak of the war, India has expressed unwavering support for Israel and explicitly condemned Hamas, although it made sure to create a counterweight by speaking of the harm inflicted on Gaza's civilian population. But that has not stopped Iran from pigeonholing India as part of the West.
Earlier this week, the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) reported that a ship with ties to Israel was attacked off the coast of India by a UAV launched from Iran. Two days ago, a ship with an Indian crew was damaged in an attack by the Houthis. In response to the events, India's Defense Minister Rajnath Singh said: "Whoever carried out this attack, we will find them even from the bottom of the sea and take tough action against them."
As attacks on ships en route to or from India continue, Delhi will have to respond in a way that shows it can be a responsible leader in the evolving maritime security architecture. The attack in Delhi is a double reminder: to Israel – that the Iranian threat of a major attack on Indian soil exists; and to Delhi – that its pro-Israel stance may come at a price.
