According to a Japanese government official, the prime minister of the Land of the Rising Sun, Shinzo Abe, is expected to meet with Iran's Supreme Leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei and Iranian President Hassan Rouhani in mid-June. It will be the first official visit by a Japanese prime minister since 1978. The purpose of the visit is to mediate between Iran and the United States and to lower the flames that threaten to burst into all-out war. U.S. President Donald Trump, it appears, supports Japan's mediation efforts.
Diplomatic relations between Iran and Japan were established in 1929, and other than in World War II, the counties maintained friendly ties. With that, according to a survey conducted by BBC World in 2012, only 4% of Japanese citizens viewed Iran in a positive light; 52% expressed negative views toward the ayatollah regime. A Pew Global Attitudes poll conducted that same year in Japan said 61% of Japanese citizens supported "tough sanctions," but 49% declared that they would accept Iran with nuclear capabilities – a far higher percentage than any other country. In December 2018, Japan's Foreign Ministry unveiled the official emblem commemorating the 90th anniversary of diplomatic relations between the countries. The emblem, which was adopted by both governments, includes elements from both countries' national flags alongside a cherry blossom, a symbol of prosperity and burgeoning ties.
Japan's foreign policy toward Iran is tolerant and consistent. Japan invests in Iran to ensure a reliable energy supply; it exports its cars and home appliances to Iran and imports oil and petrochemicals from the Islamic republic. The scope of annual trade between the countries stands at $11 billion.
The U.S. considers Japan one of its closest allies. Japan, for its part, is one of the more pro-American countries in the world. Japan, it seems, learned years ago to navigate between the U.S. and Iran; but will it be able to build bridges where other countries, such as Kuwait and Oman, have failed? In contrast to Western European countries, which picked a side and consequently became irrelevant as mediators (not just in the crisis with Iran, but the Israeli-Arab conflict, too), Japan also has another advantage: It isn't Sunni Muslim, obviously, and therefore isn't susceptible to pressures from Saudi Arabia; and above all else it doesn't have problems with a Muslim population at home.
In order to establish itself as a stable, accepted mediator on the international stage, Japan will have to preserve its independent posture and win the trust of the Iranians, the Americans and the Saudi-led coalition of Sunni countries. No less importantly, it will also have to earn the trust of Israel, with whom it has steadily strengthened relations in recent years.
